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THE DEMISE OF PROPERTY LAW
E. F. Robertsf
The law of real property in this country... is now formed into a
fine artificial system, full of unseen connexions and nice dependen-
des; and he that breaks one link of the chain, endangers the dis-
solution of the whole.
Blackstone'
Fifteen hundred alleged violations of a local housing code in the
Clifton Terrace apartment complex2 have finally undone the myth
that residential landlord and tenant lore is a topic meriting treatment
in a basic property course. No longer is it "law" that, absent an express
covenant to the contrary, tenants suffer under an implied duty to make
at least tenantable repairs.3 Shortly all landlords of residential units
will function subject to an implied duty to keep their buildings in a
state of repair commensurate with the standards set by building or
housing codes. 4 This will not be a duty landlords may avoid by express
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. BA. 1952, Northeastern University, LL.B.
1954, Boston College.
1 Perrin v. Blake (Ex. 1772), reprinted in 1 F. HARGPAV.E, A Cor.LEcroN oF TRACrs
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 487, 498 (1787).
2 Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970) (housing code violations held to justify tenants withholding rent because leases
of urban dwelling units contain implied warranties of habitability the breach of which
relieves tenants of their reciprocal duty to pay rent).
3 "In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord's obligation
to keep his premises in a habitable condition." Id. at 1077.
4 Even before Javins several decisions pointed in the same direction. Lemle v. Breeden,
51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d
268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
Lest anyone doubt that Javins reflects the wave of the future, let him ponder the
evolution of the implied warranty doctrine with regard to the sale of housing, summarized
in Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 558-62 (Tex. 1968).
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agreements to the contrary.5 No longer, moreover, are covenants in a
residential lease independent of each other so that a landlord, even
though he breaches his own promise to repair, can still expect the ten-
ant to perform his promise to pay rent. "No repairs, no rent" is the
name of the game today. Residential leases have become contracts pure
and simple and merit first year law school treatment, if anywhere, in
a general course in contracts. 6
Residential leases, property-wise, are thus following the exodus
already made by foxes,7 themselves a topic of limited relevance to
property law cast in an urban mold. In a similar vein, gifts are really
the concern of the estate planner, and bailments the concern of the
commercial lawyer. Bailments, after all, were the root of the notion of
hire-purchase and perforce of conditional sales, which are the heart of
our nationwide credit based merchandising system. Within commercial
law, moreover, bailments could be studied not merely as history but
as a viable alternative to the conditional sale. We are, after all, entering
an era when we may prefer to rent our automobile8 rather than buy
it on the installment plan, particularly since our acquisition of "own-
ership" always seems to coincide nicely with the demise of the car.
What then of commercial leases? True, the ancient rules so pecu-
liar to the law of landlord and tenant will probably carry on in this
5 "We need not consider the provisions of the written lease governing repairs since
this implied warranty of the landlord could not be excluded." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1970), citing, inter alia, Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 82 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Traditionally, most landlord and tenant reforms have allowed the parties to provide
otherwise. When in New York, for example, the legislature allowed tenants to rescind
their leases when the premises burned to the ground without the tenant's fault, the
statute carried the standard proviso "unless otherwise expressly provided." Act of April
18, 1860, ch. 345, § 1, [18 6 0] N.Y. Laws 592. The current version of this legislation now
exempts leases which contain an "express agreement to the contrary." N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAw § 227 (McKinney 1968). Similarly, when landlords were made to promise to deliver
possession, not merely the right to possession, at the start of the term, the reform was
conditioned upon "the absence of an express provision to the contrary." Id. § 223-a. With
respect to the sale of housing, see UNIFORM VENDOR & PuRc:HAsER ACr § 1 ("unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise").
More recently, however, New York has enacted legislation controlling the disposition
of tenants' security deposits, the provisions of which cannot be waived. N.Y. GEN. OBLI-
GATIONS LAw § 7-108 (McKinney Supp. 1970). See also Boyd H. Wood Co. v. Horgan, 291
N.Y. 422, 52 N.E.2d 982 (1943) (statutory proviso that landlord cannot invoke tenant's
failure to give notice as agrement to renew unless landlord timely reminds tenant of
notice requirement held not subject to waiver in lease).
6 "In our judgment the trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise and well
considered. Our holding in this case reflects a belief that leases of urban dwelling units
should be interpreted and construed like any other contract." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
7 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
8 See A. ToPPER, FuTuRE ShocK 57-61 (1970).
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field. Known rules in a game played among equals never grow archaic: 9
only the games themselves lapse, and this game seems as popular as
ever. Still, these rules play only a very minor role in the practice in
this field, given the impact of sale and leaseback, rents fixed as a share
of income, and massive shopping center promotions with mortgage fi-
nancing the complexity of which boggles the imagination. Tradi-
tional landlord and tenant lore is merely an infinitesimal part of what
has come to be "land financing," a contemporary kind of mercantile
law which blends mortgage and tax law into a workable whole.10 Out
then even with commercial leases.
After all is said and done, of course, the law insofar as it relates to
the sale of residential dwellings would still seem to be the backbone of
real property. Not so. The purchase and sale of the sacrosanct single
family house is itself becoming just another aspect of the merchandiz-
ing syndrome which typifies this society." The home is just another
commodity and is manufactured as such. Standardization and prefab-
rication are as much common denominators on suburban Sylvan Lane
as on the nineteenth floor condominium unit in a center city flak
tower.12 Indeed, there is no good reason why, to make merchandizing
of housing as easy and cheap as other commodity sales, it could not be
channeled into a commercial code of its own,13 replete with either a
Torrens system or a complete turnover of the conveyancing trade to
the title insurance companies. 14
Where does all this leave traditional property law? Kaputt. Com-
mercial leases and private apartment house investments would become
part of land financing, the sale or lease of independent dwelling units
part of commercial law, and housing for everyone else who could not
afford to pay for either a private apartment or house a part of the de-
veloping body of welfare law.15
What has happened to justify this restructuring? Nothing much.
9 Game here means game, e.g., chess. That the rules of baseball and football change
does not disprove the statement; it only illustrates how the market place corrupts.
10 See, e.g., A. AXELROD, C. BFRGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE:
CASES AND MATERIALS pt. II (1971).
11 See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965):
"We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions between Levitt's mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles ......
12 Younger readers who do not know what a flak tower looks like are advised to
consult the pictures contained in C. RYAN, THE LAST BATrrLE 514 (1966).
13 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, ACT, RECOMMENDATION & STUDY RELATING TO LIABIL-
rry OF HOUSING MERCHANTS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND BREACH OF WARRANTY, 1967 N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 65A, 9-13.
14 See Roberts, A Eulogy for the Old Property, 20 ME. L. REV. 15, 42-48 (1968).
15 See, e.g., R. LEVY, T. LEwIS & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL WELFARE
AND THE INDIVIDUAL ch. 7 (1971).
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Real property became a commodity in 1660;16 it has only taken us to
1971 to see that an "estate in land" is not peculiarly the mark of the
well-to-do requiring a lot of mumbo jumbo17 to acquire. The dollar
has democratized, albeit at the price of vulgarization, the market in
real estate. Whether in a used car lot or in a new subdivision, obscure
rules and ceremonies which slow down turnover become anachronisms
and are discarded. So it is with housing the middle class: commercial
law will triumph over tradition.
Recently perceived is the palpable fact that dealing in this hous-
ing "market" is largely a privilege enjoyed by television's Patty Duke
set.'8 Many Americans must scavenge for an older house or trailer in
order to "own" a home, put up with private apartments despite a con-
ditioned preference for a house, or queue up for public housing of one
sort or another. Here not only is it simply silly to cast law in terms of
the estate system, but even to streamline it in terms of a commodity
market is irrelevant. For many, housing has become a function of gov-
ernment, not of property law.
16 The Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. II, c. 24, 1 ENG. REV. STAT. 725 (1660) con-
verted all military tenures into socage tenures, abolishing the last incidents of wardship
and marriage. Although socage duties were still due the king, the insignificant sums in-
volved were not worth the trouble to collect. In practical effect, the Act made owners of
landholders in the same way that holders of personal property were owners.
17 "To a foreign anthropologist land transfer in the United States would probably
look . . . much like an aboriginal, ritualistic clambake." McDougal, Title Registration
and Land Reform: A Reply, 8 U. CmI. L. R v. 63, 65 (1940).
18 Between 1963 and 1969 the average new single family home increased in price
from $19,300 to $27,900. U.S. DEP'Ts or COMMERCE & HUD, CONsrRUcrON REPORTS-
CHAltAcrERumsIcs OF NEW ONE FAMILY Hoims: 1969, at 68 (1970). This price spiral is an
old story by now. The median price of new single family homes insured by FHA doubled
between 1950 and 1965, going from $8,300 to $16,600. PREsIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN Hous-
ING, A DECENT HOME 119 (1968). By first quarter 1971, the median price of all new single
family homes had reached $24,300. U.S. DE,'rs OF COMMERCE & HUD, CONSTRUCTION RE-
oRTs-CHARATERSTICs OF NEW ONE FAMILY HoMEs: FIRsT QUARTER 1971, at 1 (1971).
Take, for example, a house selling for $24,000. As one rule of thumb would have it,
one should not buy a house worth more than twice one's annual income. Thus our buyer
should be earning $12,000 a year. Yet in 1968 the median income of households was
$7,700. 65 BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
CONSUMER INCOME 1 (1969).
What if a responsible person were able to find a lender willing to go 90% at 7%
interest over a 20-year term? This would entail a debt of $21,600, and require a monthly
payment of $167.47 to amortize it. As a rule of thumb, however, a mortgage banker wants
his debtor's weekly takehome pay such that each month a week's pay will cover mortgage
payments, property taxes, insurance, and utilities. Supposing that beyond the mortgage
itself these other costs come to only $600 a year, this rule requires a weekly net income
of $217. This means an annual net income of $10,850, which in most cases must push
annual gross income over $12,000. The median house, therefore, exceeds the grasp of the
median household.
[Vol. 57:1
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Superficially, land-use planning appears to be the wave of the
future. Real property law, insofar as it is a merchandizing surrogate
is being subsumed under commercial law of one sort or another, and
public housing has been taken over by welfare. The only thing left for
property lawyers to do is to elect whether to recast themselves in the
image of mercantile or welfare lawyers, or to adopt the garb of planners
concerned with how land is used. Even the latter choice is illusory,
however, because land-use planning itself tends to be an intellectual
auxiliary servicing the commodity market. Zoning, for example, justifies
itself largely as a device to prevent the sudden deterioration of land
values by excluding gas stations on a residential street, thereby protect-
ing the value of the liens of mortgage bankers who deal in ninety-
percent-of-value loans,19 Then again, when it is not a mortgage security
protection device, zoning finds its raison d'etre as a prophylaxis keeping
out undesirables, spelled "poor" or "nonwhite," from the suburban
community.20 Urban renewal, it goes without saying, has simply been a
gigantic subsidy to center city mercantilists paid for mainly by the lower
orders whose housing, pitiable as it may have been, has disappeared
without being replaced.21
Blackstone may have been right after all. Clearly enough we have
meddled and the edifice is collapsing. We could not help but meddle,
however, because the medieval intellectual system had long outlived
19 See W. SMrrs, HOUSING: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS 305 (1970).
20 See NATIONAL COMNI'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AmEPICAN CITY 211-
17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as AMmUCAN CrriY].
21 Instead of a grand assault on slums and blight as an integral part of a cam-
paign for "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family," renewal was and is too often looked upon as a federally financed gimmick
to provide relatively cheap land for a miscellany of profitable or prestigious en-
terprises.
rd. at 153.
[It has in itself failed to help the poor and near-poor who make up most of
those who have been displaced. They have not been rehoused on the urban re-
newal sites, nor has the total volume of public housing been adequate to meet
the needs created by demolitions, deterioration, and population growth.
Id. at 167.
Although it might seem nothing more than simple civic prudence to sweep
away unsightly hovels and let the land of the affluent city be covered with good
buildings, urban renewal has itself turned out to be a civic carbuncle. It has
been very harmful and unfair to people dislodged from the slums; it has resulted
in substantial benefits to families or business which hardly require subsidies; and
it appears to create new slums where there were none before. This dubious bounty
is obtained at prodigious expense, making the whole enterprise a kind of sequel
to Alice in Wonderland. There must be a rational way to achieve slumless cities,
but urban renewal is not it.
W. SmarrH, supra note 19, at 480-82 (footnote omitted).
This is not a peculiarly American problem; the Swedes, too, have awakened to what is
going on. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
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its time. But here we reach the ultimate paradox, because if the phoenix
represented by land-use planning is going to rise from the ashes we must
return to medieval notions for inspiration.22
I
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBURBIA
Our legal machinery has become little more than an engine for
protecting the few owners against the necessities, the demands, or
the hatred of the mass of their dispossessed fellow-citizens.
Belloc23
When most of today's judges and lawyers were acquiring their
education in the law, substantive due process was exposed as a heresy
that had to be rooted out if the Republic was going to survive.24 In the
early years of the New Deal a Supreme Court dominated by opinionated
old men wrought havoc with the federal effort to regulate the economy
by giving an unnecessarily broad sweep to the tenth amendment.25
Meanwhile, state efforts at social legislation had already been emascu-
lated by the Supreme Court reading its own substantive notions of
laissez faire into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 26
Ultimately, of course, this led to a tremendous row, the upshot of which
was that the Court survived by beating a strategic retreat. Federal
authority over the economy was assured by rediscovering the true
breadth of the commerce clause.27 The state legislatures were unleashed
22 See text accompanying notes 223-52 infra.
23 H. BELLoc, THE SERVILE STATE 85 (2d ed. 1913).
24 For an urbane but quick summary of this era, see A. MASON, THE SuPREME COURT
ch. 5 (1962). For a standard liberal gloss, see A. -SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF UP-
HEAVAL pt. III (1960). For an axe-wielding assault on the Court as "the establishment"
symbol of that era, see F. RODELL, NINE MEN ch. 7 (1955).
25 See, in order, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.'238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"In terms of policy the Justices, without exception, regarded F.D.R.'s legislative innova-
tions with a jaundiced eye. Conflict among them grew out of more subtle differences
concerning the nature and scope of judicial power in a free society." A. MASON, supra note
24, at 133.
26 E.g.,'Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27,E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Chief Justice
Marshall hadinitially given a very broad reading to the notion of the authority to reg-
ulate, commerce.
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce
is to be governed. This power, .like' all -others vested -in congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its -utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the constitution.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). -And what was commerce?
- Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is 'something more:..it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and ,parts. of nations, in
DEMISE OF PROPERTY LAW
when the fourteenth amendment was found to be without any over-
tones of substantive due process.28 Indeed, the whole lesson was sum-
marized in a new litany celebrating judicial restraint, reduced by Mr.
Justice Brandeis to the first law in a nutshell.29
True enough, laissez faire never operated independently of poli-
tics; tariffs, for example, played a positive role. But still the myth
persisted that "the economy" functioned in its own right. There was,
therefore, a significant change in outlook as the result of the New Deal
imbroglio. 0 The function of government has since been seen to be that
of maintaining the private economy on an even keel by way of fiscal,
monetary, and tax devices.31 Government's role, however, remained that
of ballast: the New Deal's newly won authority was not employed to
socialize the economy. Planning and control of the day-to-day economy
were taken over by the large corporations, many of which now exceed
in wealth whole nations. Thus while government maintains the econ-
omy in equilibrium, the decisions as to what the public shall eat, drink,
wear, and otherwise consume, both physically and intellectually, are
made* by the managers of the so-called private sector. 2 Indeed, opin-
all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter-
course.
Id. at 189-90. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-47 (1827).
28 Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). "Our recent decisions make plain that
we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide
whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare." Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
29 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion).
a0 By numerous and complicated measures, sometimes connected with the policy
of taxing and spending and sometimes standing alone, manufacturing, commer-
cial, financial, and agricultural interests, once treated as primarily private and as
forming the chief economic basis of politics, were made dependent upon politics
to an extent which in this respect signalized a breach with the past.
C. BEARD, Tm ECONOnc BAsIs OF PoLrrIcs 95 (1945) (emphasis in original).
31 Sources which have inclined me to this view include J. GALBRArrH, THE NEw IN-
DUSRIAL STATE (1967); M. HARRINGTON, THE AcciDENTAL CENTURY (1965); G. MEANS, TIT
CORPORATE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1962); A. SHONFIELD, MODERN C~rrAsm: THE CHANG-
ING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965).
a2 The individual serves the industrial system not by supplying it with savings
and the resulting capital; he serves it by consuming its products. On no other
matter, religious, political or moral, is he so elaborately and skillfully and ex-
pensively instructed.
J. GALBArH, supra note 31, at 37-58. See also M. HARRINGTON, supra note 31, at 28. Cf.
H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION 11 (1969):
The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have
created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to
the commodity form. The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and con-
stantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and im-
posed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one's own
destruction, has become a "biological" need ....
1971]
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ionated young men have recently discovered as a by-product of a mis-
conceived war, that "the system" is something of a fraud since it turns
out to be either a form of corporate socialism3 3 or a corporate state.34
The death of substantive due process did not, of course, license the
several states to abolish free speech; at least the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights required the respect of state level
jurisprudence.3 5 What was unleashed was the states' authority to regu-
late their economic infrastructure as long as they did not trample upon
basic civil rights. Interestingly enough in light of the expanded com-
merce power, the states' exercise of their police power was tolerated
even when commerce was affected, at least where the state regulation
was reasonable and there was no clear showing of prior federal occupa-
tion of the particular field.3 6 As a practical matter, therefore, the param-
33 The phrase is Mr. Ralph Nader's. Discussion, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 248,
274 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970) (remarks of R. Nader). Yet the whole thrust of
Nader's own work to me betrays belief in a return to a "true" laissez faire in which the
best products resulted from honest competition guaranteed by real government controls
ensuring that competition. Although his fervor makes him the ideal leader of an emo-
tionally charged counter-reformation, experience would seem to indicate that you can-
not recreate what was. To me at least, there remains a tragic aura around him which I
should think would make sensitive people feel some concern for what he can do over
the long run with his extraordinary energy and charisma.
84 The American Corporate State today can be thought of as a single vast corpora-
tion, with every person as an involuntary member and employee .... The Cor-
porate State is a complete reversal of the original American ideal and plan....
The legal system is not primarily concerned with justice, equality, or individual
rights; it functions as an instrument of State domination, and it acts to prevent
the intervention of human values or individual choice.
C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERicA 89-90 (1970).
Or dip into A. HACrER, THE END OF THE AMERiCAN ERA 52 (1970):
Instead of government planning there is boardroom planning that is accountable
to no outside agency: and these plans set the order of priorities on national
growth, technological innovation, and, ultimately, the values and behavior of
human beings. . . . If the contours of the economy and the society are being
shaped in a few score boardrooms, these decisions, so far as the average citizen
is concerned, are in the lap of the gods.
Unlike their predecessors, neither of these critics encourages one to become active in
reforming "the system"; a sense of a Weimar hopelessness pervades their work. Professor
Reich avoids any real consideration of a revolutionary alternative by proposing a lollypot
Utopia, which might cause a cynic to wonder in view of the potential juvenile market
whether he was practicing some of the sins he inveighed against. See, e.g., Novak, The
Greening of a Con-lll-Man, COMMONWEAL, Dec. 4, 1970, at 245. Professor Hacker is content
to mimmick Spengler and actually seems to enjoy wallowing in the general decline of it all.
35 Near v. Minnesota ex re. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925). Of course, the debate still goes on as to what provisions of the Bill of Rights
are applicable to the states. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
36 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). It should
be obvious that Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851), has had a remarkable longevity.
The commonly held view that the growth of the national commerce power
[Vol. 57:1
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eters of the states' police powers were enormously expanded as a result
of the confrontation between the Court and the New Deal.
Police power, the general authority of any sovereign to legislate,
was defined traditionally in terms of health, safety, and morals.37 These
were ends toward the protection of which the exercise of legislative
authority was justified. Even so, the means adopted to achieve these
ends had to be reasonable ones.38 For example, a state might require
everyone to be vaccinated to protect the public health. It could not,
however, require that the vaccine be applied with a hot branding iron
when a simple scratching technique would suffice. 89 Thus, in its protec-
tion of public health, safety, and morals, the police power also protected
general welfare. All of this sounds innocent enough, except that in the
trend towards exercising authority over the economy, the term "general
welfare" better represented the object sought by the reformers than
did the more limited health-safety-morals triad. Gradually, almost im-
perceptibly, the trinitarian litany was tranposed into a fourfold one;
that is, the police power could be exercised to protect the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.40
has completely displaced state power is far from true. To be sure, the Supreme
Court has undertaken the role of guardian of the national market against
obviously discriminatory and parochial efforts to re-erect the type of trade barriers
that marked the preconstitutional era. But the Court has increasingly recognized
the danger of leaving large areas of commercial activity free from all regulation,
which would be the inescapable result if Congress cannot or will not act and the
states are forbidden to act.
A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AiERIcAN CONsrrrurioNAL LAw 167 (3d ed. 1964).
37 "According to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to em-
brace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as
will protect the public health and the public safety." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 25 (1905).
38 Louis K. Leggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1998). See also Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 US. 504 (1924).
39 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
40 Cooley, for example, spoke of the police power in terms of "the comfort, safety, or
welfare of society." T. CooLEY, A TREATisE ON THE CONsrrrurioNNA LIMrrATiONS 577 (1868),
Even so, a reading of his chapter on the police power illustrates a law and order notion of
general welfare in which the thrust is a negative one. To protect the general welfare,
nuisances can be outlawed. Police power is very much a "police" power. Id. at 583.
Compare with this Mr. Justice Harlan's similarly restrictive attitude, supra note 37. Even
as late as 1950, a very fine casebook carved up due process in terms of "health, safety and
morals" versus economic (i.e., general welfare) cases. N. DOWLING, CAsES ON CONSTRrImToNAr
Lxw ch. 9 (4th ed. 1950).
Arguably, "general welfare" as an end in itself entered the intellectual picture
obliquely. The federal government can tax, inter alia, to "provide for the . . . general
Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. The unreconstructed Court refused
to accept the use of the taxing power, justified in terms of the general welfare, to create
a farm subsidy mechanism. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). In this instance the
money to create a subsidy fund with which to bribe farmers not to grow surpluses was
1971]
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The licensing of government to enter the realm of economic legis-
lation was also accompanied by a general trend towards the exercise of
judicial restraint. According to this doctrine, judges should not test the
reasonableness of a police power measured in terms of what they would
have voted for had they been members of the legislature. Instead, the
question became whether a reasonable legislator could, in light of the
data available to him, believe that the legislation was necessary to pro-
tect the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, and whether the
means were reasonably adapted to achieve those ends. Thus, Mr. Justice
Holmes was proved right when, before the New Deal precipitated trans-
valuation of attitudes, he had protested that the fourteenth amendment
did not require adherence to Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.41
Consider now how another Holmes thesis was being incorporated into
the new majoritarian creed:
I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature
can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some ex-
press prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the
State .... 42
Given the demise of substantive due process, the full impact of this
idea remains to be seen.
What relevance does all this have to land-use planning? Everything,
but be patient. Reflect for a moment that the police power itself was
once defined in terms familiar enough to land-use planners:
This police power of the state extends to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the pro-
tection of all property within the state. According to the maxim,
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which being of universal ap-
plication, it must of course, be within the range of legislative ac-
tion to define the mode and manner in which every one may so
use his own as not to injure others43
raised by a tax on processors. Mr. Justice Roberts writing for the majority, could not see
how money raised from A to pay B was a "tax." 297 U.S. at 61. Indeed, for "over a century
there had been doubt whether the general welfare phrase added to the powers of Congress."
B. WsuGnr, THE GaowTH OF AMERiCAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 185 (1942). Be that as it
may, Roberts concluded that the Congress could not employ the taxing power to regulate
agriculture, a subject over which the Constitution did not give the central government
authority. 297 U.S. at 69. Then came Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) and Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), which effectively reversed Butler, Roberts by this
time having switched sides. Congressional judgments about what was conducive to the
general welfare were now controlling. Even so, the Constitution's general welfare clause
pertaining to federal taxes-now treated as a source of legislative authority-is not the
same thing as general welfare describing the authority contained in the police power and
used as a catchall phrase to summarize the health-safety-morals triad.
41 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
42 Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 US. 418, 446-(1927) (dissenting opinion).
43 Thorpe v. Rutland & B.R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1854).
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Beyond the maintenance of mere law and order, therefore, the police
power ideally aimed to establish among the citizenry "those rules of
good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent
a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of
rights by others."' 4
In order properly to appreciate these nuances, consider the dialectic
employed by the unreconstructed Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,45 the "open sesame" of land-use planning in this country.
The idea that local governments could limit the height of buildings was
sustained on the basis, inter alia, of Welch v. Swasey.48 That case had
justified the limitation in terms of safety, because, among other things,
the theoretical height to which buildings could be erected according to
modern technology might outstrip the capacity of fire fighting equip-
ment to deal with them in the event of a fire.47 The idea that nonresi-
dential uses could be excluded from residential districts was first shown
in Euclid to be merely a natural progression from traditional nuisance
law theory which had always abhorred "a right thing in the wrong
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." 48 Then the
application of these new regulatory controls was justified in terms of
health and safety. Industry, after all, presented the threat of coniflagra-
tion and heavy traffic.49 Parasites and near nuisances anyway, apartment
houses blocked out the sun so as to destroy the healthful environment
of residential playing fields, while the traffic they generated was a threat
to safety.50 Stores, moreover, only invited idlers and loiterers when they
did not breed rats, mice, fleas, and ants.5 ' Even so, the unreconstructed
Court sharply divided in sustaining zoning.
52
One wonders, however, whether in an earlier period the Court
would not have sustained zoning without all of this intellectual huffing
44 T. COOLEY, supra note 40, at 572 (footnote omitted).
45 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
47 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 373, 79 N.E. 745, 746 (1907), aff'd, '214 U.S. 91
(1909). As if to prove that life is a theater of the absurd after all, the new highrise -office
buildings which dot'Manihattan are firetraps. Without any windows to open' they are all
designed neatly to suffocate any occupants caught upstairs over a fire. It was not until after
they were built that the problem came to light. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,. 1971, §- 8,
at 1, col. 1.
48 272 U.S. at 388.
49 Id. at 391.
5o Id. at 394.
51 Id. at 393.
52 Although Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote the majority opinion, Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler dissented, an unusual split among the four real "reactionaries"
on the Court. For the story about-how counsel for the village felt during the-oral, argu-
ments, see J. METMNSAXIM, THE LAW OF ZONING 54-61 (2d ed. 1955),
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and puffing about health and safety. Would not zoning's contribution to
public convenience and prosperity have sufficed? Consider, for example,
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners.6 This
controversy arose when a railroad company was ordered to widen at its
own expense the passage under one of its bridges so that a drainage au-
thority could widen and deepen the channel that ran through the aper-
ture. As a practical matter, the railroad company would have had to
demolish its old bridge and build a new one, a fact which led it to view
this order not as a mere regulation but as a taking of property without
just compensation."4 The railroad lost the case because it was said that
the bridge crossing was held subject to the paramount right of the public
to widen the watercourse as needed. Mr. Justice Harlan gave the case a
very modern twist when he suggested that, since the state held its powers
over waterways in trust, it could not have granted the company per-
manent rights in the watercourse even if it had tried.5
What is significant about the case is that the lawyers attempted to
argue that, conceding the public authority to regulate watercourses,
those regulations had to be rooted in the public health or safety. A
drainage project which merely involved increasing the supply of tillable
land, argued the lawyers, did not come within the ambit of the police
powers; hence no regulatory order could be made by the authorities.
Harlan demolished this thesis.
We cannot assent to the view expressed by counsel. We hold that
the police power of a State embraces regulations designed to pro-
mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as
regulations designed to promote the public health, the public mor-
als or the public safety .... The foundations upon which the
power rests are in every case the same.56
Intriguingly enough, Harlan had already authored a dissenting opinion
in Lochner v. New York, 57 albeit one devoid of the rhetorical flourishes
that made Holmes's dissent therein so memorable.58 More intriguing
53 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
54 This has become a big issue in land-use litigation. See, e.g., St. Paul v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
55 200 U.S. at 586. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective judicial Intervention, 68 Mic. L. Rv. 471 (1970). Indeed, the whole doctrine
seems to have originated because of Illinois involvements with railroads. See Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
56 200 U.S. at 592-93.
57 198 US. 45, 65 (1905).
58 Holmes wrote a peculiarly fussy concurring opinion in Chicago B. &" Q. Ry. He
emphasized the point that when it came to widening and deepening the channel itself,
as distinct from widening the bridge opening, the public authorities would have to pay
the bill. 200 U.S. at 595. Again Holmes was quick on the intellectual trigger when it came
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still, it would appear to be a safe wager that Euclid would not have been
a cliffhanger had the Harlan thesis about general welfare not been
aborted by the focus on substantive due process between 1917 and
1934.0
Even after the demise of substantive due process, the general
welfare basis of the police power made a somewhat slow comeback. In
California, for example, a prohibition against building beachfront
homes set on piles was sustained in terms of morals, lest at night the
obscure areas under the houses invite fornication. 0 Still, at the very
least, the New Deal controversy did confirm that states could concern
themselves with the economic well being of the community. General
welfare tended to make its reappearance on the jurisprudential stage
in the garb of economics. When New Orleans, for example, imposed
architectural controls on the Vieux Carre, regulations which did not
better the public health and safety, and certainly were not directed at
improving the public morals, the litany ran like this:
The preservation of the Vieux Carte... is a benefit to the inhab-
itants of New Orleans generally, not only for... sentimental value
... but for its commercial value as well, because it attracts tourists
and conventions to the city .... 61
This "tourist trap" rationale has subsequently been repeated else-
where. 62
Aesthetics, as a subject for governmental concern in its own right,
became firmly established with Berman v. Parker.s In this case the
owner of a sound building located in a blighted area of Washington,
D. C. contested the authority of a local public agency to condemn the
building as part of an urban renewal scheme. The controversy came
to be phrased in terms of the scope of the police power, condemnation
being treated merely as the tool, selected in lieu of a regulatory ap-
proach, to attack the problem of urban blight.64 This being the case,
to finding that a "regulation" really constituted a "taking." E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
69 See Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Nebbia was premature vis-A-vis the ultimate confrontation between the Court and the
New Deal. This was because Mr. Justice Roberts was in a "liberal" mood in 1934 and
his vote was the crucial one.
60 McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal, 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
61 New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 851, 858, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (1941). See New
Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206,
3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
62 Sante Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Opinion of the
justices to the Senate, 333 Mass, 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
63 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
64 "The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative
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the usual grounds of health, safety, and morals would seem to have
justified the exercise of government authority, to say nothing about the
general welfare approach. Indeed, if judicial restraint had been exer-
cised, the only issue would have been whether in order to expedite the
reconstruction of a blighted area it was reasonable to include for seizure
even the occasional sound buildings within the project area.65 Mr.
Justice Douglas, however, chose the occasion to concoct an expansive
thesis.
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law
and order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of
the traditional application of the police power to municipal af-
fairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not
delimit it.... Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may
do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may
also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to
the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insuf-
ferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the com-
munity which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which
men turn....
...The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclu-
sive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legis-
lature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled .... If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as san-
itary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.6 6
The full results of these sentiments remain to be seen.
Long before the environment' became a popular topic, the New
Jersey courts proved to be peculiarly sympathetic to the notion of an
unspoiled countryside. Their opinions tended to wax so eloquent about
the rustic countryside67 that they remind the reader of the legendary
Whig judges who concocted Fletcher v. Rylands 8 in a pique against the
powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.... We deal, in other words, with what
traditionally has been known as the police power...." Id. at 31-32. "For the power of
eminent domain is merely the means to the end." Id. at 33.
65 This issue arose in Euclid, the question being whether, if it was reasonable to
exclude industry as a danger to health and safety, it was reasonable to exclude all industry
since some might not present these hazards. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926).
66 348 U.S. at 32-33.
67 Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 196-98, 93 A.2d 378, 379-80 (1952);
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 167-68, 173, 89 A.2d 693; 694, 697
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
68 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, L.R. I Ex. 265. (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3:H.L. 330
(1868).
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incursions of industry into the English countryside.69 Comparing the
joys of the countryside with the densely packed conditions in the
cities, the New Jersey judges went on to approve devices making it
more difficult for the lower orders ever to enjoy the selfsame country-
side.70 Done in the name of protecting the public health71 or in the
name of preserving the character of the affected communities 7 2 it was
also designed to preserve property values. The suggestion that these
decisions involved a healthy dose of invidious social discrimination sim-
ply did not register.73
Berman v. Parker proved a Godsend to these judges. Palisades Park,
a miniscule bedroom community just across the George Washington
Bridge, enacted an ordinance totally excluding motels from its environs,
notwithstanding that the town did have boarding houses and commer-
cial areas. The danger of motels was clear: "The environmental charac-
teristics of many of our beautiful residential communities are such that
the establishment and operation of motels therein would be highly
incongruous and would seriously impair existing property values." 74
Fortunately a new day had dawned to save these "environmental char-
acteristics" and the resultant tax base:
We are satisfied that at long last conscientious municipal officials
have been sufficiently empowered to adopt reasonable zoning mea-
sures designed towards preserving the wholesome and attractive
characteristics of their communities and the values of taxpayers'
properties.75
Needless to say, the authority relied upon was Mr. Justice Douglas.7 6
Sad to relate, this was not the end of the story. The New Jersey
court went one better and approved, upon the basis of these precedents,
the exclusion of a trailer park from a potential industrial zone in a
69 See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298 (1911). But see
Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands: A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 266
(1942).
70 Minimum bulk requirements were fixed in Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 NJ. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952). In Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J.
194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), five acre minimum lot area zoning was approved.
71 10 N.J. at 173, 89 A.2d at 697.
72 11 NJ. at 205, 93 A.2d at 384.
73 Certain well-behaved families will be barred from these communities, not
because of any acts they do or conditions they create, but simply because the
income of the family will not permit them to build a house at the cost testified
to in this case.
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 182, 89 A.2d 693, 701 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
74 Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 30, 118 A.2d 401, 408 (1955).
75 Id. at 29, 118 A.2d at 408.
76 Id. at 28, 118 A.2d at 407, citing, inter alia, Berman v. Parker, 348 US. 26 (1954).
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community ripe for urban population overspill.77 Trailer parks were
treated to the same "near nuisance" technique employed against apart-
ment houses in Euclid,7 8 their very existence being said to constitute a
threat to the public health, safety, and morals, and to cause an un-
enumerated "host of problems." 79 The opinion was built upon twin
pillars. First, exercising judicial restraint, the court noted that it is not
the function of judges to pass on the wisdom of zoning ordinances.80
Second, the court held that each community is free to plan its own
social, economic, and political infrastructure under the umbrella of the
general welfare.8 '
This time the majority logic was subjected to a searching critique
by two dissenters. As to the shibboleth "judicial restraint," they quoted
extensively from a perceptive analysis by Norman Williams, including:
The leaders of liberal-democratic thought are all too often so
confused with abstractions ("health, safety, morals and welfare,"
"character of the neighborhood," etc.), so full of respect for local
autonomy, and so fearful of judicial review generally, as to be un-
able to understand the implications of what is going on. It has not
been generally realized that in many instances the problems arising
in this field of constitutional law are closely akin to those involved
in civil liberties law, and call for similar attitudes toward the ex-
ercise of governmental power.82
The dissenters suggested that zoning was concerned with physical plan-
ning which, while it might achieve some salutary social results, was not
the same thing as a blanket license to engage in social planning. It was
fallacious to believe that general welfare meant whatever a given
municipality says that it means, "regardless of who is hurt and how
much."8 3 No matter how broadly one conceives the notion of general
welfare, it never authorized a community to erect an "isolationist wall
on its boundaries."84
77 Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 NJ. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
233 (1963).
While the record does not show any significant industrial development, the new
Freeway and the Walt Whitman Bridge have recently opened up this particular
section of south Jersey to the business and shipping centers of Philadelphia and
Camden, and to the industrial and commercial areas along the Delaware River.
Id. at 245, 181 A.2d at 136.
78 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
79 37 N.J. at 246, 181 A.2d at 136-37.
80 Id. at 242, 181 A.2d at 134.
81 Id. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137.
82 Id. at 255, 181 A.2d at 142, quoting Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living,
20 LAw & CONTEMp. PROB. 317, 349-50 (1955).
83 37 NJ. at 262, 181 A.2d at 145.
84 Id.
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While on the eastern fringes of Camden-Philadelphia the New
Jersey courts were extrapolating this gloss of exclusionary zoning, a
similar social iron curtain was descending on the western front. The
little hamlet of Paoli marks the end of the Main Line,8 5 the prestigious
string of suburban communities which over the years developed out of
Philadelphia. By the 1950's, the exodus from center city had reached
even Paoli, and new construction was going on apace north and south
of it. Just south of Paoli and south of Lancaster Pike which paralleled
the railway line, Easttown Township responded by enacting one acre
minimum lot area zoning along its northern boundary, notwithstanding
the fact that smaller lot sizes were in vogue across several streets in the
adjoining township. Ultimately, of course, a developer wanted to build
on smaller scale lots commensurate with those of the homes across one
of these streets, and the issue was joined.
The validity of this one acre zoning was sustained in Bilbar Con-
struction Co. v. Easttown Township.86 The zoning pattern across the
street was ruled irrelevant since in that respect each township was a
master of its own fate. 87 Upon this inward looking postulate was con-
structed an intellectual edifice dedicated again to the twin pillars of
judicial restraint and the expansive scope of local authority licensed by
the notion of general welfare. Indeed, the majority apologized for not
having previously given enough consideration to the general welfare
approach, the importance of which lay "partly in the fact that it admits
of aesthetic considerations when passing upon the validity of a zoning
ordinance."88 Needless to say, Berman v. Parker figured prominently in
this exercise.89
Handed down the same day, moreover, was Best v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment,90 an opinion pari materia because it rounded off the
exegesis in Bilbar. The issue in this case was simple enough: was the
petitioner entitled to a zoning variance authorizing her to convert her
mansion into a rooming house even though when she purchased the
premises there was nothing unique about them and the area was zoned
exclusively for single family residences? Conventional wisdom would
85 The "Main line" is a four lane railway track which in better days carried the
Broadway limited overnight to Chicago. Paoli is significant simply because it is the
terminal point for the two outside tracks used by commuter trains into Philadelphia.
86 893 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
87 "It is plain enough that zoning restrictions in one township cannot be permitted to
control or impinge upon the zoning regulations which a contiguous township may see fit
to adopt." Id. at 68, 141 A.2d at 854-55.
88 Id. at 72, 141 A.2d at 856-57.
89 Id. at 73-74, 141 A.2d at 857.
90 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
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have disposed of this case in a trice with a resounding negative.91 Cogni-
zant of this, petitioner attempted to outflank conventional wisdom by
arguing that police power restraints could not be imposed upon her
property to inhibit her decision-making capacity, because a rooming
house did not entail a threat to the public health, safety, or morals.
Thus the constitutional issue was created: whether the general welfare
standing by itself would support the authority of government over her
parcel. Rising to the bait, the majority pointed out that this issue had
already been affirmatively decided 92 in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois
ex rel. Drainage Commissioners.9 8 Lest this case appear obsolete, the ma-
jority invoked the recent New Jersey motel decision to demonstrate its
relevance.94 Even so, the coup de grace was delivered with yet another
elucidation of Berman v. Parker.95
What is interesting is the attack on the majority opinions by a
conservative member of the court. Justice Bell concurred in the result
in the Best case, but categorized the exegesis therein about general
welfare as obiter dicta and doctrinally nothing less than a "violation of
all the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution" because it
licensed nothing less than the exercise of an "unlimited police power."96
Working into good form with his dissent in Bilbar, Bell categorized the
developments thus far rehearsed as "the most pernicious doctrine ever
enunciated in Pennsylvania." 97 These regulations, after all, were noth-
ing more than a stratagem designed "for the benefit of only the rich
or well-to-do and are not for the general welfare."9 8 Nowhere did the
Constitution sustain the regulation of private property for such a
purpose.
Read in light of the contemporary conventional wisdom, Bell's
opinion must have caused many a snicker. Yet at least one highly
respected conservative commentator predicted that the Bilbar result was
not the last word on the subject of exclusionary zoning techniques. 99
According to Professor J. G. Stephenson:
91 Id. at 109-10, 141 A.2d at 609. The court noted that the case involved self-inflicted
economic hardship and that a variance is not a matter of right when the hardship is not
unique or peculiar to the property itself, but rather one imposed on the entire district.
92 Id. at 114, 141 A.2d at 611.
93 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
94 393 Pa. at 115, 141 A.2d at 612. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
95 Id. at 116-17, 141 A.2d at 612.
96 Id. at 120, 141 A.2d at 614 (emphasis in original).
97 393 Pa. 62, 90, 141 A.2d 851, 865 (1958).
98 Id.
99 Stephenson, Zoning, Planning and Democratic Values, in ZONING FOR MINIMUM LOT
ARAa 49-59 (2d ed. J. Stephenson, 1961).
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The causes of conflict still exist. There is pressure from people de-
siring to move from the city to the suburbs, which creates a demand
for suburban housing.... On the other hand there is the resistance
of the suburban community which sees itself about to become ur-
banized, fears the prospect of increased taxation, and seeks to
defend itself against an invasion by incompatible elements. Incom-
patibility ranges over a vast front, and includes economic, ethnic,
aesthetic, cultural and even political aspects.100
Perceptively he suggested that allowing each suburban community to
exploit the concept of general welfare in order to gather the force of
the state behind its precepts of what the character of the community
should be was licensing invidious discrimination. Stephenson reasoned
this was because, although "the American people have advanced politi-
cally to the stature of a nation, they have not advanced culturally
beyond the condition of a tribal society."' 01
Both Bell and Stephenson, interestingly enough, were treating
their readers to a healthy dose of none other than Holmes's whipping
boy, Mr. Herbert Spencer.102 After sometime reading the full texts
adverted to here, consider Spencer's notion:
[T]he duty of the state is to protect, to enforce the law of equal
freedom, to maintain men's rights-or, as we commonly express it,
to administer justice.
.. [W]henever the state begins to exceed its office of protector
it begins to lose protective power 0 3
More germane to the purposes at hand, however, we are told by another
of Spencer's few modem day fans how that sage demonstrated that "no
man... has ever been wise enough to foresee and take account of all
the factors affecting blanket-measures designed for the improvement of
incorporated humanity."'1 4 Some contingency, he says, always arises to
give the measure a turn entirely foreign to its original intention.
The full irony of this cannot be appreciated without referring to
the optimistic notions about the "general welfare" being purveyed at
100 Id. at 49.
1 Id. at 55.
102 Text accompanying note 41 supra. Quaere, did Holmes not have a great deal in
common with Spencer? It is said that Spencer concluded that "since struggle between
individuals is the plainest fact of evolution, society must do nothing to prevent that strug-
gle:- C. BRINTON, ENGLISH POLIcAL THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 231 (1933).
103 H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 228, 249 (Schalkenbach Foundation ed. 1954). "But he
was subject to insomnia, and we find him asserting the right of the State to prevent by law
the unnecessary blowing of locomotive whistles." C. BRINTON, supra note 102, at 228.
104 A. NOoK, MEMOIRS OF A SUPERFLUOUS MAN 260-61 (H. Regnery, ed. 1964).
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the national-level. In effect, the New Deal had replaced the old indi-
vidual effort, laissez-faire capitalism with a new form of capitalism in
which large, collectivized interest groups competed with each other and
through which a political equilibrium of sorts was established because
each group held the countervailing power to checkmate the others.10 5
This new equilibrium, however, depended upon a steady state of afflu-
ence, largely engineered through demand planning by the large cor-
porations. Consumption and credit were the keys to this utopian never-
never land wherein even the poor would be swept up in a spiral of
ever increasing abundance.10
A central feature in this affluence was the single family house
situated in suburbia. The substantive content of television, that is to
say soap operas and situation comedies, demonstrated a suburban bias,
while the commercial messages deliberately instilled it. Only Ralph
Kramden lived in a deteriorating city flat, and everyone was in on the
fact that he was a boob of the first rank. While the media conditioned
the appropriate responses,10 7 the federal government contributed its
share by subsidizing expressways leading out into the suburbs, 08 tilting
the income tax in favor of the homeowner,10 9 and expediting the avail-
ability of mortgage credit.110 Meanwhile, the technological society's
equivalent of the closure movement had caused a black migration into
105 See A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959); J. GALBRAIrH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: TE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-
VAILING PoWER (1952); T. Lowi, Tim END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUHORITY (1969).
106 See J. GALBRAITH, Tm AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958). See also R. HEILBRONER, THE
MAEING OF ECONOMIC SOCIETY (1962):
It was the tacit assumption-indeed, the obvious fact-that virtually every family
was in some way directly engaged in the economic process which assured a general
dispersion of income among all members of the community.
But in the highly automated world toward which technology appears to be
moving us, this universal participation in the economic process can no longer be
taken as an unchallengeable assumption.
Id. at 234 (emphasis in original).
107 This has aptly been called "the private socialization of the public taste." M.
HARRINGTON, supra note 31, at 28.
108 [C]ommunities making choices among alternative transport investments do not
confront prices which properly reflect costs. The simple fact is that highway con-
struction is heavily financed by the federal government .... The municipality is
further shielded by the state, which matches federal grants and provides additional
financing for other roads without federal participation.
No such munificence is extended to mass transit systems or commuter rail-
roads.... This naturally sets up a bias in favor of highways.
Chinitz, Introduction to CrrY AND SUBURB: THE ECONOMICS OF METROPOLrrAN GROWTH
3, 39-40 (B. Chinitz ed. 1964).
109 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 163(a), 164(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.168-1(b), 1.164-1(a)(1),
3(b) (1971).
110 See A. AOELRoD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 10, at 99-102.
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center city,"' a fact which only heightened the urge on the part of
whites to join the exodus from it.112 Clearly, the effort at local levels to
exploit "general welfare" as a license to practice exclusionary zoning
was on a collision course with the nationally instilled urge of the masses
to enjoy suburban status as part of their engineered needs. Only a
Marxist could really appreciate the beauty of this contradiction.
The picture was complicated even more when affluent suburban
communities began to zone themselves to accommodate polite industrial
and commercial operations. While these enterprises escaped the high
taxes of center city, they also provided a tax bonanza for the communi-
ties to which they moved." 3 Indeed, considering the tax base, it made
111 Enclosure of grazing fields used by the English peasantry, although it began in
the days of the Tudors, gathered momentum early in the industrial revolution and threw
thousands of rural dwellers into urban residence. See, e.g., J. BoWLE, ENGLAND: A PORTRAI
150 (1966). Notice the similarity in this country since 1900-.
While the proportion of Negroes to the total population has remained roughly
the same since the turn of the century (between 10 and 12 percent), a major
distributional transformation has taken place. Between 1940 and 1966 a net total
of 3.7 million nonwhites left the South for other regions of the United States.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND RURAL AMmRCA: POLICIES
FOR FUTuRE GROWTH 5 (1968) (footnote omitted).
"What attracted the migrants was the gleaming hope of a better life that our bustling
industrial complexes have always held out to the poor and the downtrodden." AMRmCAN
CITY 2.
From World War I on, a huge number of Negroes did move from the rural
South to big cities of North and South. But the big move is almost over. Within
the United States, Negroes are now more heavily concentrated in cities than
whites are....
. . . Nowadays, however, more and more Negro migrants are moving from
one northern metropolitan area to another; fewer and fewer are moving directly
from the rural South to cities of the North and West....
Besides, job opportunities attract many more people from one metropolitan
area to another each year than they induce to move into metropolitan life for the
first time.
Tilly, Migration to American Cities, in TOWARD A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 152, 160-61
(D. Moynihan ed. 1970) (emphasis in original).
112 "Between 1950 and 1960 some 100,000 of Newark's white residents moved out, and
Negroes and Puerto Ricans moved in." N.Y. Times, July 25, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
The difficult problems of white-Negro relationships have been worsened by
the population changes described. The large increase in the population of Negro
Americans in urban and metropolitan areas over a relatively short period of time,
and the contrasts in background and life styles between Negroes and whites by
reason of the disadvantaged position of Negro Americans over the years, have
combined to generate tensions that may well constitute the most serious domestic
problem of the United States for some time to come.
Hauser, Population Composition and Trends, in TOWARD A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 26,
36-37 (D. Moynihan ed. 1970).
113 For example, modern industrial plants and research laboratories are usually
physically attractive. They can provide substantial amounts of property tax
revenue, and they require very little in the way of local public services. In par-
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far more sense to zone for these enterprises than for medium priced
housing, because company headquarters buildings obviously do not
need to be sent to school.114 Today, the real growth in commercial and
industrial research park development, and perforce jobs, is in suburbia
rather than in central city.1" 5 If the economy was becoming suburban,
then exclusionary zoning practices were acquiring a dual aspect of
evil. They were excluding the moderate income people who could
afford modest housing from ready access to work, and they were actually
cutting the poor, not so likely to have cars, out of the picture entirely.
Inevitably, of course, this phenomenon was noticed in profes-
sional"16 and popular"17 literature. As a matter of fact, Father Theodore
Hesburgh some ten years ago was complaining that "[t]here are the
unspoken but very effective conspiracies of builders, real estate brokers
and good neighbors who are downright arrogant in preserving the
blessings of democracy for their own white selves alone.""18 Mr. Justice
Douglas himself discovered that "[r]eal estate brokers and mortgage
lenders are largely dedicated to the maintenance of segregated com-
munities." 9 More interesting, however, the attack on exclusionary
zoning was joined by some home builders, who discovered themselves
subject to a "land-use squeeze" and who came out in favor of "higher-
density development."' 20 This latter development should cause one to
proceed cautiously in evaluating the "liberal" awakening of conscience.
What then had been accomplished under the caption of general
welfare as perceived from the suburban perspective? In the New York
metropolitan area, ninety percent of the vacant land was zoned for
single family residences on lots of at least one-quarter acre, while two-
ticular, the plants themselves do not add to school costs, which are heavily sup-
ported by the property tax. Thus, communities readily zone for "clean" industry.
D. NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS: DIAGNOSES AND PrFScRiPnIoNs 95 (1970).
114 [A] community composed of moderate-value houses will have a limited tax
base, but its families are likely to be relatively young, with large numbers of
school-age children . . . . For example, suppose that a community is spending,
net of state and federal aid, $500 for each public school pupil, raised from the
property tax. If the school property tax rate is 2 per cent of the market value of
property, the school taxes on a $20,000 house will be $400. If the typical family
has two children in the public schools, there will be a fiscal "loss" of $600 on each
such house.
Id.
115 See text accompanying note 137 infra.
116 E.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REy. 767 (1969).
117 E.g., Patterson, The Wall of Zoning, COMMONWEAL, May 28, 1971, at 283.
118 N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
119 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (concurring opinion), citing U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL Rsrrs, CIVIL RIGHTs U.S.A.: HousmNo IN WASHNGTON, D.C. 12-15 (1962).
120 HousE AND HOME, July 1971, at 59 (editorial).
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thirds was pegged at least at one-half acre.121 In Connecticut, more than
half the vacant residential land in the whole state was zoned for lots of
one to two acres, while almost forty percent of the residential land
within mass transit commuting distance from New York City was zoned
for four acres.122 At the same time, houses built on lots of one-quarter
acre were selling for a minimum of $25,000 in the New York region;
those on one-half acre lots in New Jersey for more than $30,000; and
those on an acre or more in southwestern Connecticut for over
$45,000.123 All of this caused two observers to conclude that "perhaps
25 percent of the population, earning $12,500 or more, can afford to
buy houses built on this land."' 24 Thus what had begun in the context
of liberalism resulted in a system of law at the local level which must
have evoked a wry smile from the spirit of Hilaire Belloc.
II
THE EXPOSURE OF SUBURBAN BIAS
The civil power must not serve the advantage of any one individ-
ual, or of some few persons, inasmuch as it was established for the
common good of all.
Leo X111125
It was Easttown Township which, in National Land & Investment
Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,126 provided the basis
for a judicial response to this inherent contradiction. After Bilbar East-
town was subjected to even more overspill pressure from Philadelphia
because a new expressway had opened up residential development north
to Paoli. Thus an ever expanding circle of development began to move
south to intersect the arc moving west along the Main Line itself. The
local response was to upzone the community from one to as much as
four acres. As viewed from Easttown's perspective, this strategy was
designed to maintain the character of the community. Apart from some
commercial activity along the Lancaster Pike, the township was pre-
dominantly a bedroom community. Whereas sixty percent of the citi-
zens resided on twenty percent of the local area, the remaining forty
percent occupied eighty percent of the area. Restrictive covenants al-
121 AMERICAN CITY 214.
122 Id. at 215.
123 Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Con-
trols, 22 SYRAcusE L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1971).
124 Id. at 525.
125 I OE ALE DEl (1885), quoted in JOHN XXIII, PAcEM IN TERMS § 56 (1963).
126 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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ready fixed a full ten percent of the township into a matrix of four, five
and ten acre lots. Thirty-five percent of the township was left one acre,
thirty percent was raised to four acres, while another seventeen percent
was hiked to two acres.
This is not to say that the township had stopped growing. Public
school population, for example, had been approximately 500 in the
academic year 1955-56, but had risen to roughly 1,000 in 1963-64, and
projections anticipated a figure in the 1,700 range by 1969-70. Building
permits were being issued at the rate of one hundred per year. Even
so, the southern half of Easttown was still held in large parcels; it was
this semirural area that was being preserved by the imposition of the
four acre requirement. The zoning ordinance had the effect of locking
large parts of the township into a posture more appropriate to a Pier-
son v. Post 27 scenario than to the land hungry appetite of a satellite
community.
The ordinance was not without police power rationalizations.
With the township still largely dependent upon septic tanks, large lots
were said to protect the public health. Safety too was a factor, since the
quaint, winding roads in the estate areas of the township were catego-
rized as inadequate for modern traffic. Finally, proponents of the
scheme contended that it preserved "an area of great beauty containing
old homes surrounded by beautiful pasture, farm and woodland."'128
Admittedly the area was "a very desirable and attractive place in which
to live."'1 29 Throughout the township one could detect Berman v.
Parker providing the intellectual background music.
Inevitably confrontation arose when a developer wanted to con-
struct a subdivision in the one acre mode. Suffice it to report that the
ordinance was declared unconstitutional. The sewage argument was
not credited 30 and the road argument was demolished. 1 1 The roads
were adequate enough for the time being and the township could not
rely on zoning as a new version of mortmain "to avoid the increased
responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth
invariably bring."'132 The major thrust of the opinion was aimed at
obliterating the notion that zoning was so readily available as a simple-
minded device by which to preserve the character of a community.
127 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
128 419 Pa. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.
129 Id.
130 Apparently sewage was brought into the equation after the upzoning was already
accomplished and, even then, would only ultimately become a problem if the whole town-
ship were actually developed on a one acre basis. Other means than zoning, however,
were available to attack this problem-i.e., establishment of a sewer system.
131 419 Pa. at 526-28, 215 A.2d at 609-10.
132 Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
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If the township really wanted to create a greenbelt, it behooved it
to condemn one rather than to create one via the regulatory mode. If
the township really wanted open space, then it should amend its zon-
ing ordinance to encourage cluster development. If the town really
wanted to preserve historic homes, then it should busy itself zoning
their immediate environs and not the whole southern portion of the
community. Finally, if the township really wanted to preserve its char-
acter, it should think again because a maze of even four acre homes
ultimately would not be compatible with its own pseudo fox hunting
characterization of itself.
Warming to the theme, Justice Roberts condemned fiscal zon-
ing:I a3
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into hith-
erto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live.
We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary pur-
pose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid fu-
ture burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities can not be held valid.'34
Thus was Easttown thrown open, at least to those who could afford a
house built in a residential development with a one acre minimum lot
requirement.
More recently another, and much more significant, exclusionary
zoning case was decided in Pennsylvania.'35 This time miniscule Nether
Providence Township, zoned predominantly residential, concocted a
zoning ordinance which, although it did not explicitly prohibit multi-
unit apartment buildings, failed to provide for them. According to
the local authorities this lapse should not have caused any concern
since one could always ask for a variance. Unwilling to undermine the
restraints designed to limit variance-inspired leakage in zoning mat-
rices, the majority in Girsh Appeal did not accept this "initially appeal-
133 Fiscal zoning seeks to exclude . . . any proposed development that might
create a net financial burden and to encourage development which promises a
net financial gain. Fiscal zoners try to strike a balance so the tax revenue which
new development will contribute to local coffers will at least pay for the public
services which that development will entail....
The most serious effect of fiscal zoning is the spate of exclusionary practices
relating to residential development. The aim, of course, is to keep out the lower
income groups, and especially large families which require significant public ex-
penditures in education, public health and welfare, open space, recreational
facilities, police and fire, and the like.... Usually nobody bothers to ask where
the families who are being excluded should live.
A-mr_AuN Crry 19.
134 National Land 8: Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
532, 215 A.2d at 597, 612 (1965).
135 Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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ing" thesis.136 Instead the majority reemphasized the National Land
tenet that zoning could not be exploited in order to avoid the pressure
of increasing population and the resultant need to expand the public
service infrastructure. Going beyond the generalities of National Land,
however, the majority took judicial notice of the place suburbia had
come to occupy, not only as a massive bedroom, but also as a center for
employment.
Figures show that most jobs that are being created in urban areas,
including the one here in question, are in the suburbs.... Thus
the suburbs, which at one time were merely "bedrooms" for those
who worked in the urban core, are now becoming active business
areas in their own right. It follows then that formerly "outlying",
somewhat rural communities, are now becoming logical areas for
development and population growth-in a sense, suburbs to the
suburbs. 8 7
Once again judicial notice was introduced into the appellate procedure
to expose the local legislature's lack of wisdom and good sense.18
The real thrust of Girsh was illuminated by the majority's pro-
testations of what it did not hold:
It is not true that the logical result of our holding today is that
a municipality must provide for all types of land use. This case
deals with the right of people to live on land, a very different prob-
lem than whether appellee must allow certain industrial uses
within its borders.8 9
Notwithstanding this jurisprudential protestation of modesty, it is ar-
guable that, relative to living accommodations, the case did hold that
a zoning scheme had to be premised on a philosophy of pluralism.
One might like to push the Girsh result to the point that it stood
for the following proposition: resolved, that every zoning ordinance
must provide places within the community for a full spectrum of
classes, be they the five acre rich or the publicly subsidized poor in a
crowded highrise. Internally scrutinized, Girsh does not go anywhere
near this extremity. First, the developer who penetrated the exclusion-
136 Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396.
137 Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398 (citation omitted).
188 The use of judicial notice by judges in the process of striking down legislation
underwent a period of intellectual unpopularity when Mr. Justice Butler invoked a
cracker-barrel homily in order to nullify an early marketing reform statute. Jay Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924). In the same case Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent
exemplifies how judicial notice of facts could be employed to sustain the reasonableness
of the legislation. After judicial restraint became the order of the day, most cases in-
volved the use of the technique to sustain legislation.
189 437 Pa. at 245-46, 263 A.2d at 399 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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ary wall wanted to construct "two nine-story luxury apartments," 140
hardly the answer to the majoritarian needs of nearby overcrowded
Philadelphia. Second, the opinion tossed the ball back to the legisla-
ture, suggesting that enclaves of exclusionary zoning might be appro-
priate if in the suburban arc equally attractive areas were thrown open
to settlement by lesser mortals.141 Given the suggestion that Bilbar was
also an invitation to the state legislature to become responsive to the
demands of pluralism, 142 this last throwout may have a dubious net
value in the market of the politically practicable.
These reservations are not the end of the matter. Three justices
dissented. The ultimate result, therefore, turned upon the reaction of
now Chief Justice Bell. He preferred, understandably enough, to say,
"I told you so":
One of the most important rights... which (at least until recently)
has differentiated our Country from Communist and Socialist
Countries, is the right of ownership and the concomitant use of
property. The only limitation ... was "sic utere tuo tu alienum
non laedas" ....
Then along came zoning with its desirable objectives. How-
ever, desirable or worthwhile objectives have too often been car-
ried to an unfair or unwise or unjustifiable extreme .... 14
The result in Girsh thus depended upon both a "liberal" response to
urban woes and a "conservative" urge to limit again the authority of
government to matters of the public health, safety, and morals.
Interestingly enough, the leading trade journal in the building
field took up the banner of pluralism and condemned zoning as a tool
all too readily exploited "to prevent new housing for anybody but the
upper middle class and the rich."'144 At the same time the Clearinghouse
Review suggested how to attack exclusionary zoning in an article in
which the first caption brazenly proclaimed "Substantive Due Pro-
cess.''145 After this burst of enthusiasm, however, cooler heads began
140 Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396.
141 Id. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d at 899 n.4.
142 I do not believe that the decision in the Bilbar case means that one acre
zoning is now permissible in Pennsylvania. I believe that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has simply said that this is a question which should be resolved
in the first place by the General Assembly, which should also determine whether
individual municipalities are competent to deal with zoning problems which
now transcend county lines.
Stephenson, supra note 99, at 50.
143 437 Pa. at 246, 263 A.2d at 399-400 (concurring opinion).
144 HousE & HomE, May 1970, at 73.
145 Schwartz, Exclusionary Zoning-Suggested Constitutional Attacks, 4 CLEAMNG-
HOUSE Rav. 345 (1970).
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to express some reservations. As for the builders, their "motivation is
obvious; if required lot sizes can be sharply reduced, they can often
sell the smaller lots for almost as much as larger lots, and thus receive
a fine windfall-but with no benefit to those seeking inexpensive hous-
ing."'146 As for loud hurrahs about the "liberal" legal crusade to force
smaller lot zoning, the evidence does not support the notion that lot
size zoning itself was a major factor in preventing cheaper housing.
There are several reasons for this. First, just because land normally
costs so much less than enclosed space (i.e., housing), minimum-
lot-size requirements inevitably have a far lesser impact in raising
housing cost than do minimum-building-size requirements. Second,
the implicit assumption in most attacks on large-lot zoning is that
the price of land increases more or less pro rata with the size of the
lot-and, conversely, decreases pro rata for smaller lots ...
[W]ithin any given community, the cost of lots does not vary di-
rectly with their size, or anywhere near that. .... Moreover, a coun-
tervailing factor may be at work. In many communities, more
expensive subdivision improvements are required in more inten-
sive subdivisions, frequently starting somewhere in the range from
a half an acre to one acre. If such requirements are imposed, the
result may even be that, as developed land, smaller lots are actually
more expensive than larger lots.147
If, therefore, the pot has begun to boil, the plot has also begun to
thicken insofar as the lower orders are concerned.
It is possible, of course, to anticipate a revival of substantive due
process as attacks are made on suburban zoning.14 Taking at face value
the flair for "doctrine" as opposed to "holdings" which now predom-
inates in America one could suggest that the "law" now requires that
each community must devise a zoning ordinance which anticipates the
development of the community along the lines of residential plural-
ism. 1 49 What is required, after all, is "a balanced community-[one]
providing shelter for all economic levels that may wish to live in the
146 Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern
New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475, 497 (1971).
147 Id. at 496 (emphasis added). See also AMERICAN Crry 226:
Generally speaking, if zoning is changed to permit higher densities-more units
per acre of land-the price per acre in most areas of strong market demand can
be expected to increase...
It is not surprising, therefore, that zoning is subject to enormous pressures
by landowners and developers and that outright corruption is far from rare.
148 Thus the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing has filed suit
in Oyster Bay, L.I., the ACLU in Black Jack, Mo., and the UAW in Mahwah, N.J. See
Patterson, supra note 117, at 284-85; N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at 1, col. 5; see also N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1970, at 33, col. 5.
149 This is precisely what the Girsh dissenters saw inherent in the majority result.
437 Pa. at 251, 263 A.2d at 402 (dissenting opinion).
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community, for those who will teach in their schools, clerk in their
supermarkets, and work in their industrial plants."' 5 0 As a matter of
fact, this statement does not go far enough, because merely zoning areas
for lower income groups does not necessarily mean that the housing
will be built. Nay, the emerging truth is that no community's land-use
plan is valid unless it programs pluralistic development and unless it
includes a government-sponsored program to produce housing at the
lower reaches of the spectrum should market forces prove unrespon-
sive.151
III
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRocEss
Zoning law is public law .... The treatment of zoning law as
a branch of local real estate law rather than as a branch of con-
stitutional law... is largely due to the unwillingness of the United
States Supreme Court to see zoning as regulations affecting people
and not just as regulations affecting land.
R. F. Babcock52
Interest in the notion of substantive due process recently has been
revived, particularly since Griswold v. Connecticut.'53 That was the
cause cdlibre in which a divided Court'1 cut down state legislation
making it a crime to dispense birth control data even to married cou-
ples. The problem was that conventional wisdom fabricated during the
New Deal days required a policy of judicial restraint since, morals and
general welfare being involved, the wisdom inherent in the legislation
was not of judicial concern.155 In point of fact, this very proposition
150 AmBIcCaN Crry 19.
151 I used this sentence in a talk on environmental law problems in Washington,
D.C., early in 1971 and it was regarded as much too avant garde. Now, however, there
may be growing recognition of the point:
This evolving rationale is not yet fully articulated in any one decision, but the
direction in which these decisions are pointing is clear. Under this approach,
in planning for housing needs, local government is under an affirmative duty to
make some appropriate provision for all groups in the population, and specifi-
cally for low- and moderate-cost housing.
Williams & Norman, supra note 146, at 499 (footnote omitted).
152 R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAmr: MUNICIPAL PRACIcES AND POuCIEs 15 (1966).
153 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154 Mr. Justice Douglas authored an opinion expressing the views of five members
of the Court. Three of the majority, however, joined in an amplifying opinion authored
by Mr. Justice Goldberg. Justices Harlan and White, although concurring in the result,
each authored yet another opinion. Justices Black and Stewart each dissented and joined
in each other's opinion.
155 See text accompanying notes 27-29 & 80-81 supra.
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was the whole thrust of Mr. Justice Black's dissent,156 rehearsing as it
did the now ancient battle fought and won to exorcise substantive due
process from the nation's jurisprudence.
Likely enough the justices who did the deed were embarrassed by
it, because no coherent rationale emerged from their ratiocinations. To
avoid the role of super-legislature, Mr. Justice Douglas chose to employ
the obvious truth that in no event did the New Deal reconstruction
ever license the several states to trample upon free speech and other
basic rights.157 The problem was to discover a fundamental right in the
Bill of Rights upon which to hang this idea. Never at a loss for orig-
inality, he discovered a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees"'u6 into which the offending legislature had
trespassed. Perhaps more relevant to the effort to restructure the con-
stitutional apparatus to the contemporary needs of the common man
was Mr. Justice Goldberg's resurrection of the ninth amendment,6 9
but more of this anon.
Instead of trying to make too much of Griswold, it might be safer
to chalk it up as an instance where substantive due process, however
disguised, had to be revived momentarily in order to solve an awkward
problem which the local authorities lacked the character to resolve
themselves. Fluke that it was, the case is still instructive if one accepts
Douglas's "zone of privacy" as something more than the product of
expediency. That is, the notion of "privacy" as an extremely significant
counter on the intellectual gameboards involves not merely ad hoc im-
provisations but a plan to consider "rights" in functional terms suitable
to this age. Functionalism goes beyond substantive due process.
Whereas substantive due process involved trying to graft the ideology
of laissez faire onto the Constitution, functional reinterpretation en-
tails actually recasting that document's concepts of personal rights into
a meaningful form notwithstanding the nature of the economic realm.
In a sense the notion of "privacy" entered the dialectics of consti-
tutional law obliquely in a series of cases concerning procedural due
process. Thus, still reflecting New Deal postures, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter could refuse to impose upon the state courts the federal rule ex-
cluding illegally obtained evidence,160 even though "one's privacy ...
is basic to a free society."' 6 Yet in 1961 Mr. Justice Clark, himself a
16 381 U.S. at 507.
157 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
158 381 U.S. at 485.
159 Id. at 487 (concurring opinion).
160 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
161 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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product of the New Deal experience, could affirm the turnabout enun-
ciated in Mapp v. Ohio162 and insist that "we can no longer permit
that right to remain an empty promise."'1 3 Somehow the Court had
come to perceive a new environment which demanded change notwith-
standing the convention of judicial restraint. Even though the Court
later eschewed the intention to promulgate any "general constitutional
'right to privacy,' "164 it ultimately returned to the notion that there
does exist a "fundamental ... right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's pri-
vacy.' u65
What happened was that the Court had sensed the old Horatio
Alger myth was dead. One could no longer claim some remote home-
stead or hope to market a better mousetrap in order to create his own
economically independent fiefdom; a private world was no longer a
viable alternative to the public one. Farming had become collectivized
and invention corporatized. Indeed, economic independence had be-
come an illusion; everyone's status was dependent upon the new gov-
ernmental-industrial behemoth. Thus, as Professor Reich perceptively
pointed out, status had become the new property which, if any freedom
was to be possible, had to be protected by some new notions of due
process.166 Even the poor began to acquire some rights in their status
as a class entitled to welfare.267
The point is that "privacy" is not merely a fourth amendment
right to be free from police raids. It is much more encompassing, be-
cause what it really entails is the creation of a substitute for the old
economic independence, in the form of a set of ground rules defining
a property right in status in the new system. Barring the articulation
of such a right, only the hippies are free when they opt to drop out of
the system; but for most of us this avenue is not readily available and
even for hippies appears to have become largely illusory. 68
162 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
163 Id. at 660.
164 Katz v. United States, 289 U.S. 247, 350 (1967).
165 Stanley v. Georgia, 294 U.S. 557 (1969).
166 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
167 E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (welfare recipients entitled to
access to divorce courts without payments of fees and costs); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397
U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare cannot be cut off without
evidentiary hearing); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residence requirement
as condition precedent to welfare violative of right to travel).
168 Drug merchants are profiting off them, while the fashion industry simulates
their garb and makes their life style "fashionable" to emulate in straight society. Quaere,
is Marcuse all that wrong when he posits that we suffer from "repressive tolerance?" H.
M, cusE, AN EssAY ON LDERATION (1969).
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It would follow, of course, that if lawyers have a "right" to their
licenses, the poor have a right to a decent roof over their heads. Inter-
estingly enough, very much like the alleged right of every man to a
decent environment, this latter right has largely been limited to ex-
hortation 6 9 and left by the judiciary to the legislature for implemen-
tation.170 Even so, the question ultimately will have to be decided by
the Court. This is not merely to invoke again the observation that
every question in America finally becomes a legal one, but rather to
suggest that the secret to America is that the Court, in the last resort,
performs the function of a House of Lords and contributes to the mac-
rocosmic political restructuring necessary to keep the system responsive
to fundamental change in the socio-economic sphere. Law in America
is high politics pure and simple, albeit carried on by a self-perpetuat-
ing elite in their own language.
How, then, is exclusionary zoning going to be brought within the
parameters of this functional restructuring? Most likely the equal pro-
tection concept is the Archimedean fulcrum by which restructuring
may yet be engineered. Enough cases have already coalesced to sustain
the proposition that planning and zoning decisions calculated to im-
plement invidious discrimination violate the equal protection princi-
ple.171 Going further, authority has begun to accumulate which at least
recognizes that under equal protection
it may well be, as matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a
city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan as initiated
or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low-income families,
who usually-if not always-are members of minority groups.1 7 2
Add to this, in the area of black-white relations, the notion that the
community must provide to the poor the same level of municipal ser-
169 E.g., Housing Act of 1949, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970): "The Congress declares
that the general welfare and security of the Nation ... require . . . a decent home and
a suitable living environment for every American family .... "; National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970): "The Congress recognizes that
each person should enjoy a healthful environment .... "
170 The Court has not really uttered a definitive word about zoning since Euclid,
while its record relative to the environment can only be described in terms of an intel-
lectually undignified rout. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), and
note particularly the dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas (id. at 505).
171 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Ranjel v. City of Lan-
sing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 980 (1970). See generally Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause,
56 CORNFLL L. Rnv. 343 (1971).
172 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291,
295-96 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See Sager, supra note 116, at
792 (1969).
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vices as it provides to other groups,172 and one has, without too much
imagination, the basis for an argument that the community must zone
to provide areas where low cost housing can be built and, if it is not
provided by the market, to construct the requisite housing itself.
The problem, however, is that exclusionary zoning does not
merely exclude blacks; it excludes even middle income whites.174 At
issue are not merely questions of race but of class. Given human nature,
racial prejudice is at least understandable; but given an overwhelm-
ingly white society which has spent billions on public education to in-
still the democratic ethos, this element of class discrimination must
give one pause. The time is ripe to examine several cases in which the
Court has had an opportunity to deal with these questions within the
context of purported democratic values.
In 1964 California voters overwhelmingly approved the enactment
of an amendment to their constitution making legally sacrosanct the
right of any person in his absolute discretion to sell or lease his prop-
erty to anyone.17 5 In Reitman v. Mulkey 7 6 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia condemned the measure on grounds of equal protection
violation. The United States Supreme Court agreed177 in light of the
finding below that the measure was designed to "encourage and sig-
nificantly involve the State in private racial discrimination."'78
The four dissenters179 were unable to see how the state, by adopt-
ing a neutral stance when it came to private prejudice, could have run
afoul of the fourteenth amendment. Without positive proof that it had
been inspired by any invidious purpose, an enactment which was "sim-
ply permissive of private decision-making.., and one that has been
adopted in this most democratic of processes"' 80 should not have been
struck down, at least on federal grounds.'-' What is particularly inter-
173 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
174 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 35, col. 4.
175 Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 26 (1964).
176 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
177 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
178 Id. at 376. The majority included Justices Warren, Douglas, Brennan, White, and
Fortas.
179 Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart.
180 387 U.S. at 391.
181 Discernible in the dissent is a hint that the California judges were making new
federal constitutional law to strike down the enactment because they could not find any
of their own law with which to do it.
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esting about the dissent is the notion that the state can be neutral
about anything, an intellectual idiom suitable perhaps to Spencer's era
but hardly compatible with today's totally involved governmental
structure.18 2
The real pyrotechnics were caused by Mr. Justice Douglas's con-
curring opinion. Apart from repeating Father Hesburgh's old condem-
nation of real estate brokers, mortgage lenders, and builders who
conspire to maintain suburban segregation,8 3 he raised the crucial
point 84 that leaving the zoning function to local groups that practice
racial discrimination is the very kind of state action condemned in
Shelley v. Kraemer.8 5 Within the parameters of Reitman's issues this
observation was dictum; but, it is difficult to see how this thesis, un-
like Douglas's language in Berman v. Parker, could be exploited by
exclusionary zoners to achieve their own ends.
More recently, the post-Warren Court was called upon to decide
James v. Valtierra,188 another case originating in California. This time
the controversy arose over a state constitutional amendment which
provided that no low income housing project could be developed by
public housing authorities until the project was approved by local vot-
ers in a referendum. 87 California jurisprudence had traditionally given
the local citizenry the power of initiative and referendum over the acts
of local government, but a recent court decision had exempted hous-
ing agencies from this checkmate because they made "administrative"
and not "legislative" decisions.188 Within six months of that judicial
decision California voters adopted the constitutional amendment in
question.
Again the word "neutral" figured in the Supreme Court's result.
According to the majority,18 9 the measure was neutral because it ap-
182 As an intellectual exercise the reader might consider for himself how "neutral"
the government can be when it comes to the church and state issue. Compare the ma-
jority opinion in Reitman authored by Mr. Justice White with his opinions in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 US. 672 (1971).
183 387 U.S. at 382-83.
184 Id. at 384-85.
185 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
138 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
187 No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or ac-
quired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified
electors of the city, town or county . . . voting upon such issue, approve such
project ....
CAL. CONST. art. 34, § 1 (1950).
188 Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 557-58, 219 P.2d 457, 460-61
(1950).
189 This time the majority consisted of Justices Burger. Black, Harlan, Stewart, and
White.
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plied to "any low-rent public housing project, not only [to] projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority."'190 In addition, California
history evinced a long tradition of giving "citizens a voice on questions
of public policy."'191 Indeed, according to the majority, rather than in-
volving state approved discrimination, the system here manifested a
"devotion to democracy.' 92 Having thus decided the neutrality of this
enactment, the majority then trailed off into variations on the theme
to the effect that the "people ... have ... decided," and that "all the
people of [the] community will have a voice."' 9 3
But Justice Douglas, having created an intellectual Frankenstein
in Berman v. Parker and having seen the ultimate issue in Reitman
without a word of apology for his own responsibility for the situation
in suburbia, contributed not one iota to James. "DOUGLAS, J., took no
part in the consideration or decision . . . ."194 Instead Mr. Justice Mar-
shall authored the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
They objected that the majority was now allowing class discrimination,
which-given common knowledge of how suburbanites would vote-
indeed they were. Thus the dissenters highlighted the very essence of
the James decision: it is appropriate to discriminate against the poor
as a class via the ballot box so long as the discrimination is not based
upon racial criterial
With James, any notion of substantive due process or functional
restructuring, as an intellectual proposition was dealt a mortal blow
when it came to opening up suburbia along truly pluralistic lines. As
long as it was color blind, local decision making was the distillation of
the democratic process. Yet, and here is the key, local decision making
now could continue to exclude the white middle income types and in
perpetuity escape the charge of invidious racial discriminationl As if
to prove the Marxist thesis that economics will always triumph over
race, it may now be true that a number of middle class blacks support
this status quo.195
To make matters worse, the concern over the quality of the en-
vironment threatens to be exploited for private ends, just as zoning
has been. One recent suit seeks to halt further development in Suffolk
County outside New York City "until ecologically sophisticated, envi-
ronmentally responsible criteria for such development have been es-
190 402 U.S. at 141.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 142, 143.
194 Id. at 137.
195 See, e.g., N.Y. .Times, Feb. 15, 1971; at 33, col. 1.
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tablished. If successful, the suit would virtually halt all residential,
commercial and industrial property development in the county."'196
The Colorado Environment Commission proposes to limit the popula-
tion of Denver and to construct a greenbelt around it to stop further
growth.19 7 The difficulty with these ideas is that although they promise
a fine environment for those already there, they raise serious questions
about the rights of newcomers.198 In England, at least, the increment
of class hypocrisy in the environmental movement has not escaped no-
tice. 199 In America, given the post-Warren Court, no clear answers ap-
pear to be in circulation.
IV
THE FUTURE: IRRELEVANCE OF CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM IN A NEW BALL GAME
The trouble is that there is still no centre. The moral and intel-
lectual failure of Marxism has left us with no alternative to heroic
materialism, and that isn't enough. One may be optimistic, but
one can't exactly be joyful at the prospect before us.
Sir Kenneth Clark200
Edmund Wilson perhaps best reflected democratic values when he
observed that, even though one might be thoroughly disgusted with
the rampant materialism inherent in the American system,
[he] ought not to complain of the many cars, the "mobile homes,"
of the movies and television sets, of the grills for outdoor cooking.
None of these things seems to me attractive, but I probably have
no right to be contemptuous about or to blame them entirely on
the people who manufacture and advertise them. If people want
them, why should they not have them?201
196 Suffolk County Defenders of the Environment v. County of Suffolk, No. 70-C1278
(S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 9, 1970).
197 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1971, at 49, col. 5 (city ed.). Precisely how density within the
new limits is to be controlled is not explained.
198 If no-growth approaches are adopted, what will become of the right to traved?
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 U.S. 618 (1969).
199 Their approach is hostile to growth in principle and indifferent to the needs
of ordinary people. It has a manifest class bias, and reflects a set of middle and
upper class value judgments. Its champions are often kindly and dedicated people.
But they are affluent and fundamentally, though of course not consciously, they
want to kick the ladder down behind them. They are highly selective in their
concern, being militant mainly about threats to rural peace and wildlife and well
loved beauty spots; they are little concerned with the far more desperate problem
of the urban environment in which 80 per cent of our fellow citizens live.
The Times (London), Jan. 8, 1971, at 10, col. 6 (summary of Fabian Tract 404).
200 K. CLARK, CIVILISATION 847 (1969).
201 Wilson, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1971, § 7, at 14.
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This may be a lesson the extreme environmental activists still have to
learn, since their ultimate no-growth policies seem almost designed to
deny the working classes their place in the suburban sun.20 2
"Snob zoning," of course, may best be "solved" by the legislature.
This really is the lesson contained in Girsh203 which seems, moderately
enough, to suggest that a regional planning mechanism should be de-
vised to create a pluralist suburbia in which each class could find its
proper place. More interest, however, is being generated by the notion
of statewide land-use planning2 4 which presumably would allow each
class its niche outside center city. Whether this interest in formulating
state planning derives from a concern for the lower orders or reflects
instead an irritation at the lack of order when a multitude of tiny ham-
lets makes any planning impossible, is difficult to tell.20 5
Then again, perhaps the best answer is to allow some state agency
to punch holes in the suburban exclusionary ring by authorizing it to
construct low income housing without regard to either local zoning
ordinances or building codes. Massachusetts, for example, requires that
a miniscule percentage of vacant residential land in each community
be made available to non-profit or limited-profit housing sponsors for
development. 206 In New York the Urban Development Corporation is
authorized to override local laws if it finds that a site is appropriate for
low or moderate cost housing.20 7 Even so, the Massachusetts legislation
in effect legitimizes exclusionary zoning of more than ninety-nine per-
cent of a local community,208 and the UDG in New York has never ex-
ercised its power to enter a community against the will of the local
government.209
202 See, e.g., Gibbons, Hardhats, Hyacinths and Returnable Bottles, COMMONWAL,
June 25, 1971, at 324. See also Harrington, The Politics of Pollution, CommoxwAL, April
17, 1970, at 111.
203 437 Pa. 237, 245 n.4, 263 A.2d 395, 399 n.4 (1970); text accompanying notes 155-43
supra.
204 See, e.g., ALI MODEL LAND DEVELoPMENT CoDE xiii (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1971):
[Tentative Draft Number 3] presents the most far-reaching and contro-
versial material submitted up to this point. . . . To what extent should the
interests of the state as a whole be brought to bear on the local desires reflected
in a local plan or ordinance regulating land development?
See also HAAI REV. LAws § 205-2 (Supp. 1970).
205 See, e.g., AmcAN CrrY 208-10; Anderson, Symposium-Exclusionary Zoning:
Introduction, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 467 (1971).
206 MAss. ANN. Lws ch. 40B, § 20 (Supp. 1970).
207 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6283 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
208 The Massachusetts approach applies to 10 acres or 0.3% of vacant residential land,
whichever is larger. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 40B, § 20 (Supp. 1970).
209 It is common knowledge in New York that UDC is hampered as a developer
because in land transactions it must operate so as not to suffer a loss. Until it can suffer
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Court cases based-upon notions of equalprotection or judicial nu-
,ances hinting revival of substantive due ,process, together with legisla-
tion envisaging broader approaches to planning or limited efforts to
interpolate some "poor" into suburbia, all reflect perfectly logical re-
sponses to the problem of exclusionary zoning. That is, if the problem
is simply the abuse of the authority to zone at the local level, then a
few minor adjustments in the system will set everything right again.
The only trouble with this analysis is that it applies remedies which
should have been applied to suburbia a score of years ago, before'the
existential scene had rendered the underlying structure something
wholly different. Herein is a phenomenon that has to be elucidated.
To steal a technique from McLuhan, one must face the truth that
"suburbia is the city." Put another way, the "largest city in America
is now the suburbs of New York. '210 These suburbs contain a million
more people than New York City and cover 2,100 square miles 211 They
are ceasing to be merely bedroom communities; 212 instead they are be-
coming the place where new jobs are being created, particularly blue
collar jobs.213 Like it or not, America has discarded the city, tradition-
ally viewed as a populace psychologically loyal to a central core of civic
buildings, and has instead adopted the style of Los Angeles-non-cen-
tral, atomistic, free wheeling.214 In effect, while the authorities have
,been grappling with the problem of the ungovernableness of the large
city, the people have elected to return to the modem equivalent of the
village and to discard the city model. The real problem is that this new
life style is only available to the relatively well-to-do. Economics have
created a geographical barrier; the affluent exist in Los Angeles and the
rest of the community exists in the classic city mold. The crunch comes
when one realizes that it is not because of human failure that the prob-
lems of the large city are unsolved, but because the city in America is
writedowns and be clearly authorized to enter the new town field, UDC is closer to an
enlightened private developer than a public agency. Whether it wil actually develop into
a significant force depends upon whether the voters in November 1971 approve a constitu-
tional amendment. (1971) Sen. Int. No. 1432 (Mr. Barclay), (1971) Assy. Int. No. 7747
(Rules Comm.).
210 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
211 Id.
212 Not one of the suburban counties around New York City sends even half its
workers there. Id., col. 7.
213 NATIONAL COMm. AGAINSr DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, JoBs AND HOUSING 6-7 (1970).
214 Los Angeles may swell physically to the size of a sub-continent, but the
tropical luxuriance of its physical growth may never succeed in making a city of
it. In order to become a city, it would have also to evolve at least the rudiments
of a soul.
Toynbee, Introduction .to Crrias or DESTINY 13 (A. Toynbee ed. 1967). . .
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a defunct institution which no cure can revive. The problem is not
how to renew the city but how most gently to write it down.
Viewed as a rear guard action, the empirical results of urban re-
newal make sense. Insofar as habitability is concerned the deterioration
of cities has probably been accentuated, but their viability as commer-
cial and communications centers has been maintained. Let us put the
paradox in its most ruthless perspective. Once upon a time cities were
centers of urbane civilization, whereas Fort Riley, Kansas, was an out-
post in the badlands where the law did not reach. Today the suburbs
are the center of urbane civilization and the center city commercial
blocks are the modern day equivalent of Fort Riley surrounded by
hostiles. Thus the idea of tinkering with traditional city and suburb
devices to reform this situation is a patent absurdity; the old dichotomy
has been transposed into an entirely new phenomenon.
If the reader doubts what is being said, let him reflect upon the
real world around him rather than upon the conventional images of
that world portrayed in books. The posse has become a fact of life in
residential neighborhoods in the city.215 Commercial blocks, as if pro-
tected by a moat, can be reached via direct public transportation from
suburbia. The fortress idea, reminiscent of the middle ages, appears
daily in advertisements for luxury apartments. Indeed, almost as proof
in the pudding that the cities are passe, they are being left to the Blacks
to inhabit, a hallmark in racist America that something has ceased to
have any real value.
Even saying all of this does not really illuminate the ultimate
crisis in this scenario. True, there is inherent here an element of apart-
heid, which currently attracts the most attention, perhaps because the
idea of "equal protection" is still meaningful to Americans. Within
the context of the new suburban city, however, the poor are no longer
black; they are rather every man not a member of the upper middle
class. That is to say that although racism may be bad, a society which
discriminates immorally against ten or twelve percent of its members
can nevertheless survive. A society, however, whose institutions mani-
festly discriminate against the majority is not likely to survive as a
democratic society. Such is the inherent ultimate issue.
The real contradiction in American society is that its white, blue
collar classes are being excluded from the new city developing in sub-
urbia. It is not the minority which is being discriminated against but
the majority. Incredibly, eighty percent of the families in the New
York City area have been priced out of the new housing market en-
215 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 8, 1971, at 33, col. 1.
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tirely. 16 It is not guerrilla warfare by blacks in urban ghettoes that is
to be feared by those who would sustain American institutions, but
the reaction impending in the lower middle classes when this discrim-
ination becomes common knowledge. They are already confused by
losing a war, resentful of public largesse being spent on welfare, and
prone to bemoan the decline of law and order. The shock of recogni-
tion that the economic system has relegated them to a form of second
class citizenship may prompt a radical reaction which could make the
spectre of resurgent McCarthyism seem a mild threat indeed.
Adding an even more tragic dimension to this equation is the pal-
pable fact that fortunes have been made speculating in land..2 17 More
fortunes stand to be made by heeding the call to provide for some
higher density areas in suburbia..2 18 This is so because the conventional
system of land-use controls has been exploited at two very different
levels. As a "democratic" device, exclusionary zoning accurately reflects
the desires of the haves. Thus political careers can be based upon ex-
emplifying a proper reverence for sound zoning. At the very same time,
at the governmental level where day-to-day decisions are actually made,
the land-use system can be exploited to keep developable land at a
premium so that extraordinary capital gains are available for, shall we
say, those persons more directly involved in the decision-making pro-
cess.219 By and large, conventional land-use controls are tainted with
corruption, 2 0 which must give one pause before accepting the idea
that merely elevating decision making to the state, or even the federal
level, will somehow set everything right.
216 Id. Aug. 16, 1971, at 35, col. 4.
With apartment development blocked by zoning regulations, and with the
minimum price for new houses ranging from $30,000 in Suffolk County to as high
as $50,000 in Westchester, the vast majority of people taking new blue-collar jobs
in the suburbs will continue to find themselves priced out of housing near their
places of employment.
Id., Aug. 18, 1971, at 47, col. 1.
217 Land is the coin and the treasure of the suburbs around New York City and
that land-some of which has risen in value in 20 years from $700 to $90,000
an acre--is the prize in a continuing battle for control of the 775 municipalities
that make up the world's largest suburban area.
Id., Aug. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
218 "But the top value of that acre depends on zoning-an acre worth $90,000 today
for high-density use like office buildings or garden apartments is worth only $10,000 if it's
zoned for one single-family home." Id. at 39, col. 2.
219 See, e.g., id.
220 Zoning affects land values in a number of ways....
It is not surprising, therefore, that zoning is subject to enormous pressures
by landowners and developers and that outright corruption is far from rare.
Increasingly frequent newspaper exposes of corruption are dramatic and un-
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Suburban land values have in some cases increased at a rate of
fifteen percent a year.221 Inevitably the price of suburban land escapes
the capacity of the lower orders to purchase it, because in no event is
their purchasing power increasing at the same scale. Even if building
codes could be modernized to expedite cheaper construction tech-
niques, 222 this escalation of land values must in and of itself price more
and more people out of the market. Thus, and this is crucial, at the
very same moment that discontent is arising about the efficiency of con-
ventional land-use controls, the price of land on the urban fringe
threatens to create an explosive political situation which could rock
the Republic to its very foundations. Quaere, therefore, whether or not
the times have actually become propitious to suggest that the answer
to both these problems is for state government to acquire the land
around suburbia, hold its value down to current levels, and release it
only according to a statewide plan for pluralistic development.
Of no little moment is the fact that the ideas of Professor John
Reps have reached the casebook level of visibility, including his notion
that
some public agency with metropolitan jurisdiction might acquire
raw land, plan it, provide street, utility, park, and other needed
improvements, and then convey lots, blocks, or neighborhoods to
private builders for development as planned and as controlled by
deed restrictions. This would accomplish three things: it would
provide a public yardstick operation against which purely private
land development activities could be measured, it would establish
a more precise tool of environmental control and guidance, and it
would, paradoxically enough, aid private enterprise and the com-
petitive market by making it possible for small builders who can-
not afford the uncertainties and costs of the modern scale of land
development to stay in business.223
Reps, of course, does not stand alone; witness the brilliant young archi-
tect who, after considerable experience in the field, concluded that
fortunate testimony to the relation of the control process to private market
forces.
AEucAN Crry 225-26.
221 Id. at 385. See also PRFEsDENs's CoMM!. ON URBAN HousiNG, supra note 18, at 141.
222 Of those governments which had a building code, 66 percent of them pro-
hibited the use of plastic pipe in drainage systems, 44.5 percent of them prohibited
preassembled plumbing packages, and half (49.6 percentD] of them prohibited
2-by4 studs every 24 inches on non-load-bearing interior partitions, still re-
quiring them to be only 16 inches apart. The last mentioned item requires 50
percent more studs every 4 feet of continuous wail.
AmERICAN Crry 22.
223 Reps, Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning, in C. BERGE, LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE: CASES, STATUTES, AND OTHER MATERLS 823, 825 (1968).
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"the concept of private ownership of land in the urban context is ob-
solete." 224
More revealing still is the fact that at least some official state pub-
lications are beginning to talk in terms of widespread government
land acquisition for future development projects.225 Public awareness
of greenbelts226 and the concept of public ownership 227 is not something
novel within the American context. The whole scenario was rehearsed
in a federal report in 1941 which, if read without reference to its actual
date, appears to be contemporary:
Public acquisition of land is a powerful tool in controlling the
development of new areas....
One objective of land acquisition in new areas is the develop-
ment of... self-contained neighborhood units ....
A second objective is the establishment of greenbelts....
The purpose of the greenbelt is to break up the continuous,
disorderly, sprawling growth of the city and, by permanently with-
holding certain areas from settlement, to force new development
into a clustered pattern. It limits the size of neighborhoods and
communities by girdling them with a greenbelt, yet does not limit
the number of such communities that may gather as satellites
around an urban center....
The land within the greenbelt has far more than a negative
value, however. The open land that weaves through the outer ur-
ban area is the logical path of modem motor highways, string
parks and parkways. . . . The land need not remain in public
ownership. Properly protected by zoning laws or deed restrictions,
there is no reason why greenbelt land cannot be sold to private
persons for truck gardens, golf courses, picnic grounds, athletic
fields, or other extensive uses....
Another objective of land acquisition in the urban peripher-
ies is the establishment of municipal land reserves. The public
land reserve, like the greenbelt, is a multipurpose project. First, it
may serve as a greenbelt, if properly located. It will keep out rag-
ged and spotty expansion, forcing new development to fill in exist-
ing open spaces. As parts of the land reserve are sold into private
ownership, a residual part may be kept permanently in public own-
nership as a greenbelt. Second, it will serve as a source of well-
planned house lots. As the pressure of urban expansion warrants
224 M. SAFDIE, BEYOND HABITAT 234 (1970).
225 N.Y. URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. & N.Y. OFFICE OF PLANNING COORDINATION, NEW
COMMUNIriEs FOR NEW YORK 64 (1970).
226 E.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 529, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965): "they cite the preservation of open space and the
creation of a 'greenbelt' which, as most present day commentators impress upon us, are
worthy goals." See also W. WHYrE, THE LAmT LANDSCAPE 152-62 (1968).
227 E.g., N.Y. URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. & N.Y. OFFICE OF PLANNING COORDINATION,
supra note 225, at 89-54.
[Vol. 57:1
DEMISE OF PROPERTY LAW
it, the city may plat and sell lots designed on the self-contained
cell concept, or it may sell the land in chunks to developers, reserv-
ing the necessary parks, school sites, and so on.... Finally,, it may
be used to control speculative booms in building lots and to put a
ceiling on land prices. When subdividing threatens to get out of
control, the city's supply of usable lots at low prices may exercise
a very salutary influence.228
In short, we have long had available an alternative strategy with which
to attempt to plan a more rational society.
We may yet choose a new praxis. Zoning and local government
devices demonstrably have not worked very well to control haphazard
development and urban sprawl (although they may have worked too
effectively to exclude the lower orders from suburbia and catalyze
them into action against the socio-political consequences of suburban
land prices). That is, we might choose to socialize land, at least on the
urban fringes, and then either keep it in public ownership, leasing it
back to private use, or sell it back to private use at a subsidized price
after stamping it with covenants locking it into regional master plans.
Given the commitment to proceed along this avenue, we should have
a way to develop some adequate responses not only to exclusionary zon-
ing, but also to the broader question of whether we can plan a city and
make it livable. Suburbia, after all, is our city of the future now being
born, and there is still time to house-train the creature.
Observe how, as analyzed here, the decision to socialize is essen-
tially a conservative response to the potential consequences of not mak-
ing the decision. Within the traditions of property law, moreover, there
is nothing particularly radical in visualizing land being owned by the
sovereign and being channelled out again to persons who would hold
it only as long as they performed the requisite duties which went with
the land. In this instance, of course, instead of knighthood service, the
landholder would have to hold and use his parcel according to the
purposes set forth in the regional or statewide master plan.
Is the notion of a state condemning wholesale the fringes of sub-
urbia in order to plan the future city constitutional? Berman v. Parker
would provide an affirmative answer. Given general welfare as the ob-
ject of this exercise, and granted that the power of eminent domain
228 NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BD., PUBLIC LAND ACQUISITION IN A NATIONAL LAND-
UsE PROGRAm pt. II, 17 (1940). The report, however, was not naive enough to ignore the fact
that "public ownership of large tracts of open land, whose value may increase markedly
over a decade... may prove to be an almost irresistable [sic] invitation to chicanery and
favoritism." Id. For my own part, I do not believe we can go on much longer refusing to
regard the collusion of speculators and public offidals as some kind of "economic crime"
meriting punishment at least equal to that imposed for armed robbery.
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would be employed merely as a means to the end, the judiciary would
have to exercise restraint and, presumably, put its imprimatur on the
scheme. We need not speculate about Berman v. Parker, however, be-
cause we now have Rosso v. Puerto Rico,229 a case more directly in
point.
Several years ago the Puerto Rican legislature determined that
"lands adapted to urban development.., are monopolized and kept
unused by their owners, which creates an artificial shortage of land and
raises its price at a rate higher than the raise [sic] in price of other prop-
erties and staple commodities" and that this phenomenon made it "im-
possible for persons of moderate or low resources to purchase land in
appropriate areas, and forces such persons to build their homes.., far
from their places of work... 2 30
Ihis ever-increasing price of land cannot be controlled, nor the
problems thereby created can be solved, by any of the tools avail-
able to the Commonwealth and municipal governments; .. . the
levy of taxes and the regulations of physical planning are insuffi-
cient; ... the regulation on subdivision and zoning operates pro-
spectively for undeveloped and underdeveloped areas and cannot
prevent the undesirable, but legal, use of the land; and ... the
regulation on land subdivision is insufficient to control either the
expansion of city limits or the disconnected and inadequate expan-
sion of the cities... P1
The response to this problem entailed the creation of a Land Ad-
ministration with sweeping authority to acquire land by purchase or
condemnation. 23 2 The Administration's powers included the authority
to acquire real property
which may be kept in reserve towards facilitating the continuation
of the development of public work and social and economic wel-
fare programs which may be under way or which may be under-
taken by the Administration itself [or] by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico ... for the benefit... of the community, including,
but not limited to, housing and industrial development programs
233
Early in 1963 the Land Administration decided to acquire two
229 - P.R. - (1967), appeal dismissed per curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968). An English
version of the decision can be found in Brief for Appellant at 82, Rosso v. Puerto Rico,
393 U.S. 14 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Brief].
230 Puerto Rico Land Administration Act, Statement of Motives (a), [1962] P.R. Laws
2d Reg. Sess. 11.
231 Id., Statement of Motives (b).
232 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311f(j) (1964).
233 Id. § (s). See also Ram6n, The Puerto Rican Land Administration Act-Audacity
in Land Planning, 24 REv. C. ABo. P. R. 555 (1964).
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parcels owned by Rosso, a contractor and developer. Rosso asked both
the agency and the governor to reconsider the decision, but the agency
denied his request because his land was necessary to preserve the co-
herence of the plan for the San Juan area. When Rosso still refused to
negotiate a sale of the parcels, the agency resorted to a "quick take"
provision and title to the land was vested in the government.234 Rosso
retaliated by suing to enjoin the condemnation proceedings until a
court could determine the constitutionality of the whole scheme.235
After the proceedings had been stayed pending a decision on the merits,
a lower court held the legislation unconstitutional.23 6
The trial judge was of the opinion that the Land Administration
could condemn lands "to reserve them for the purpose of aiding the
development of definite housing projects and... known programs ....
In short, every condemnation is valid, when it pursues a public pur-
pose." 23 7 The difficulty was that no one had concocted a precise plan
for what was going to be done with the Rosso parcels, so it was really
impossible to sustain the proposition that the public necessity required
the exercise of the power to condemn in this instance. "The 'necessity'
that justifies a condemnation," according to the court, "is that which
presently exists or which may exist in the immediate future and its
existence is necessary both for the condemnation and the public work
contemplated. A future, indefinite, remote or speculative necessity is
not sufficient." 238 Immediate practical needs, therefore, had to be dem-
onstrated by the agency; a vague notion of the need for a land reserve
was not enough.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, however, sustained the Land
Administration in an opinion which, to say the least, has its unique
aspects.23 9 First of all, the late Justice Becerra did not say that the trial
judge's doctrinal exegesis about public necessity was wrong in the sense
234 At the time the complaint was filed in the Superior Court, estimated just
compensation of $1,381,676.00 was deposited in the Registry of the Commonwealth
Court, and a Declaration of Taking was filed pursuant to which an Order was
entered by the Court vesting title to the property in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 226 F. Supp. 688, 689 (D.P.R. 1964).
235 Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 226 F. Supp. 688 (D.P.R. 1964) (federal court should not
involve itself in complicated constitutional litigation at first instance).
236 Puerto Rico v. Metropolitan Constr. Corp., reproduced in Brief 58-81.
237 Id. at 63.
238 Id. at 77. See also Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. 1967): "A
future hope based on speculation is not sufficient to justify the taking of private property
in a condemnation proceeding. But a condemning authority may consider those demands
which may be fairly anticipated in the future."
239 Puerto Rico v. Rosso, - P.R. - (1967); Brief 82-126.
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that he had applied the wrong rules. Rather, it was "out of focus."
That is,
[i]t responds to yesteryear which was characterized by the limited
and restricted function of merely governmental acts .... It also rep-
resents the stale individualistic concept of the exclusive right to
the use, enjoyment and disposal of property by the owner, which
no longer prevails, when it is necessary to confront it with the com-
mon good.240
Instead, according to Becerra, the environmental problems of this
epoch involve urbanism, a phenomenon which necessitates a wholly
new perspective.
Thus, for example, a United Nations report had suggested that
"[t]he lack of the requisite legal power to promote development and
to channel it in desirable directions often handicaps urban plan-
ners .... 241 In light of speculation in land values, Stockholm author-
ities had concocted a land ownership program "to secure sites ... and
to influence the price of land .... -242 Be that as it may, Becerra sug-
gested that these concepts were not peculiar to "the Nordic and Anglo-
Saxon communities which are today extensively socialized." 243 Indeed,
similar responses were now appropriate in Catholic countries. True
enough, Leo XIII would appear to have made private property as sac-
rosanct as any fan of Adam Smith might have desired.244 Indeed, as
John XXIII noted, this obsession with private property had the result
240 Id. at -; Brief 104-05.
The "common good" as opposed to the "general welfare" is a notion derived from
scholastic philosophy. E.g., ST. THoMAS, SuMMA THEoLOGICA, ch. xiii, question 90, art. 2.
Before anyone concludes that they are the same thing, let him see how the scholastic
world may be very different from that of the common law by perusing the following:
The human person is a part of the political community and is inferior to the
latter, according to the things which compensate in him the needs of material
individuality .... Thus, for instance, a mathematician has learned mathematics
thanks to the educational institutions which social life alone has made possible
.... And the community is entitled to ask the mathematician to serve the social
group by teaching mathematics.
And, on the other hand, the human person, as a superior whole, dominates
the political eommunity [sic] according to the things which belong to the ordina-
tion of personality .... And the community will never have the right to ask a
mathematician to hold as true one mathematical system in preference to another
one ....
J. MARITAIN, ScHoLAsTIcIsM AND POLrrIcs 60-61 (3d ed. 1954) (emphasis in original).
241 - P.R. at -; Brief 105, citing People and Living in V U.N. CONF. FOR APPLICA-
TION OF Sci. & TEcH. FOR THE BENEFrr OF UNDERDEVELOPED AxEAS 167 (196S).
242 - P.R. at - Brief 106, quoting J. GRAHAm, HousiNG IN SCANDINAviA 7 (1940)
(emphasis in original).
243 Id. at - Brief 109.
244 Lzo XII, RERum NovARum § 5 (1891).
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that every "precaution was to be taken lest the civil authority intervene
in any way in economic affairs." 245 But in light of the way in which the
existential world had evolved, John had gone on to modify this doc-
trine, even concluding:
Obviously, what we have said above does not preclude owner-
ship of goods pertaining to production of wealth by States and
public agencies, especially "if these carry with them power too
great to be left in private hands, without injury to the community
at large."246
What was the meaning of all this? Nothing less than that private
property is now a "social concept, ' 247 and like all social concepts is sub-
ject to the duty of properly constituted authority to safeguard the rights
of the human person. 248 Modem existential reality fairly compels a no-
tion of private property subject to the demands of the general inter-
est.249 Included among these demands is the need to hold property
according to a "socializing orientation" which admits of a broadened
concept of the public need, thus justifying a new definition of the pub-
lic use basis of the condemnation power.250
With the emergence into philosophic respectability of a socializing
orientation, the sovereign could condemn land simply to bank it; no
specific project would have to be on the drawing boards. Left to its
own devices, after all, the market in land was rampant with "profiteer-
ing, speculation and monopoly... and artificially fixed prices to the
profit of the speculator. '251
The Trial Court was of the opinion.., that Act 13 and its
means and methods are not anything else but a mechanism in the
hands of the State to freeze and regulate the price of land. If the
freezing or regulation of prices of land produces a rational way to
solve the problem under attack, there is nothing unconstitutional
in it. Likewise, if an [sic] order to remedy the evil the Land Ad-
ministration has to become a dealer in lands, even if for the pur-
pose of keeping them in reserve to provide for the future, and all
of which is for a social benefit, there is nothing unconstitutional in
it.
As remarked by Judge [sic] William 0. Douglas, the State, if
it so desires, may adopt a socialist economy; even though in order
245 JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISRA § 11 (1961).
246 Id. § 116, quoting Pius XI, QuADRAGEsIMO ANNO § 114 (1931).
247 - P.R. at - Brief 121.
248 Id. at -; Brief 114.
249 Id. at--; Brief 116-17.
250 Id. at -; Brief 117.
251 Id. at -; Brief 123.
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to do so, it must pay for the private property it converts to public
use.
2 52
Thus was the notion established, at least in Puerto Rico, that land
banking could be instituted by the state under the guise of a public
purpose condemnation.
By mainland standards, the notion that land banking can be em-
ployed as a device to control disorderly suburban growth marks and
possibly exceeds the outside limit of the public purpose concept which
traditionally has defined the scope of the condemnation power.20
Again by mainland standards the ratiocination employed by the Puerto
Rico court, and particularly its source materials, may strike some as
totally alien. But this is the point: the court had to expand its intel-
lectual horizons in order to redefine the institution of private property
in terms of a new environment. The very same need exists on the main-
land. The problem confronting us is not merely one of exclusionary
zoning by which the poor are kept out of the suburbs. Rather it in-
volves the exclusion of the majority from the city of the future during
its formative stages. Given this existential situation, Rosso should be
seen as "good law" even if, like other landmark decisions, law review
addicts may have a field day critically dissecting its reasoning.
0 Freunde, nicht diese Tdnel Let me simply suggest a few theses
which can serve to wrap up this exercise.
(1) As a matter of substantive due process, any zoning ordinance
which does not include a full spectrum of residential accommodations
is void on its face and unenforceable.
(2) If the ordinance provides for residential accommodations for
the lower economic classes but the authorized housing is not in fact
built, the ordinance is also void on its face unless the local government
itself builds or has built the requisite housing.
(3) A state agency must soon be created to draft a statewide mas-
ter plan. Regional land administrations would supersede local govern-
ment with respect to the implementation of the plan.
(4) The regional land administration would condemn land now
on the fringes of expanding suburbia, together with all available un-
developed tracts within it. This land would then be fed back to devel-
opers so as to control where future growth occurs, in what fashion it
252 Id. at -; Brief 124, citing Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920), and W. DoucLAS,
THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY (1963).
253 See, e.g., Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d
903 (1962) (vacant land can be condemned in order to be redeveloped as an industrial
park); Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1967) (evidence of necessity justifies
condemnation of land to allow for airport expansion).
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occurs, and at what price it occurs. In short, land itself would be social-
ized.
Whereas the first two theses are "legal," obviously the last two are
initially "political"--although a conservative judiciary could certainly
veto the implementation of the fourth thesis. In this regard, Rosso is
a crucial case. More immediately, however, it is significant because it
illustrates the willingness of at least one American jurisdiction to face
the political need to reexamine the mode in which development of
land is to be controlled in this last third of the twentieth century. The
difficulty is that, content as we are, only the first thesis has attracted
our attention. There is little that we can do now but patiently await
the ultimate crunch. But thus it always was.
CONCLUSION
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer
Yeats2"
Engels once observed that human history appears to differ from
natural history because "nothing happens without a conscious purpose,
without an intended aim."2r5 Even so, "the many individual wills ac-
tive in history for the most part produce results quite other than those
intended-often quite the opposite; .. . their motives, therefore, in
relation to the total result are ... of only secondary importance ... "
Hence, "[h]istorical events ... appear on the whole to be... governed
by chance. ' 256 At this point the late Georg Luk~cs would suggest that
the "essence of scientific Marxism consists . . . in the realisation that
the real motor forces of history are independent of man's (psycholog-
ical) consciousness of them."257
Certainly anyone who has studied the history of property law
ought to have at least some sympathy for this truth. For example, the
promulgators of Quia Emptores, hell bent to preserve their feudal
rights, did not realize that they were injecting into the system a slow
poison which proved fatal. The difficulty is that if we recognize that
Engels was on to something, how do we relate to what is going on
around us today? What actually are the motor forces compelling us
254 The Second Coming, in THE COLLECrED POEMs OF W. B. YEATS 184 (2d ed. 1951).
255 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, Ludwig Feuerbach and The End of Classical German
Philosophy, in SELECTED WoRKs 594, 622 (Moscow 1968).
256 Id. at 623.
257 G. LuKAcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MAWLXST DIALEcriCs 47
(R. Livingstone transl. 1971).
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towards building a molecular city in what is now a suburb?2 58 Can we
endure the freeways as we hobnob between its centers and nodes? 25 9
Will we, in fact, have to seek liberation by turning inward to the
psyche?260 Certainly it is only the Socratic law teacher who can feel se-
cure in these times since, after all, his work is done when he simply
poses the questions.
When murders in New York City run roughly half the rate of our
losses in Vietnam, when our holiday vehicular accident toll exceeds
the regimental casuality rate of a serious infantry firefight, when pro-
miscuity becomes a way of life, when universities are reduced to trade
schools-one may question whether this society can endure. The ulti-
mate issue with which we shall eventually have to deal is whether
planning is possible in a society which does not have principles and
goals to attract the allegiance of its overwhelming majority. However
stale, the challenge thrown down by Yeats still confronts us. Put an-
other way, the final issue of our day is still the need to find an aesthetic
which justifies cooperative existence in this world. I would suggest that
the challenge facing us, notwithstanding the Soviet experience, is how
it might be possible to substitute for contemporary chaos an aesthetic
patterned upon an inspired socialism illuminated by humanism. Un-
til we begin to grapple with this fundamental question, we are simply
postponing the evil day until, unstructured completely, we shall be
powerless to respond when the rough beast, its hour come round at
last, slouches towards Bethlehem to be born.
258 See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of City Planning, Concept Los Angeles, Map, Aug. 18,
1970.
259 See, e.g., Nevins, The American City in History, in Crras OF DESTINY 296, 817
(A. Toynbee ed. 1967).
260 Toynbee, Introduction to id. at 27.
